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ABSTRACT
The legal concepts Inherent in the area of account
ants’ civil liability have evolved over a period of many
years.

The English Courts contributed the basis of this

evolutionary process by delineating a set of legal doc
trines which, if necessary, could have been applied to
cases of accountant-third party litigation.

The American

Courts later gave impetus to the development of this body
of law by interpreting and specifically applying the
early legal doctrines.

Yet, the most significant step in

the developmental process was the result of the New York
Court’s attempt to balance legal equity with social need.
This judicial balancing process produced a doctrine of
accountants’ civil liability which has severely limited
the ability of third parties to recover pecuniary losses
from public accountants.
Today, the American Courts are continuing in their
attempts to balance legal equity with social need.

Yet,

in attempting to accomplish this task, the individual
courts have created two significant legal problems for
the public accounting profession.

First, the attempts of

the individual courts to implement this balancing process
have resulted in a series of decisions which have produced

iv

a significant gap between legal and professional inter
pretations of the public accountant's audit responsibili
ties.

Second, the attempts of the individual courts to

implement this balancing process have resulted in the
promulgation of at least six distinct concepts of liability
placement.

These two problems have forced members of

the accounting profession to assume a defensive posture,
and therefore, have significantly hampered the profession's
attempts to keep pace with the growing information needs
of economic society.
An analysis of the reasoning and facts underlying
this judicial balancing process produces two significant
results.

First, such an analysis reveals that there are

significant legal reasons for extending the third party
liability of public accountants.

Second, such an analysis

reveals that such an extension of the public accountant's
third party liability will not have detrimental effects
on either the accounting profession or economic society.
Thus, an analysis of facts and reasoning inevitably results
in the conclusion that the liability of public accountants
to third party financial statement users should be extended.
To implement this conclusion, and to provide a
basis for solving the problems which confront public
accounting, a five step approach was presented.

First,

it was proposed that the public accounting profession
should be allowed to establish the standards of conduct by
v

which its members will be judged.

Second, it was proposed

that the courts continue to use the concept of the reason
able man as a means of comparing the activities of
individual accountants with those which would have been
required by professional standards.

Third, it was pro

posed that the courts refuse to recognize the legal va
lidity of overly broad disclaimers or qualifications of
opinions.

Fourth, it was proposed that the courts con

tinue to hold accountants liable to third parties in cases
of pure fraud.

Finally, it was proposed that the courts

hold public accountants liable to all reasonably foresee
able third parties when the accountant is guilty of any
form of negligence.

Such a five part doctrine of account

ants' liability will introduce both certainty and equity
into an otherwise confused area of the law.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The issue of accountants’ legal liability to
financial statement users has been one of significance
for both the accounting and legal professions.

The

constantly evolving relationship which exists between
certified public accountants and the users of the finan
cial statements that they examine has been one of the most
volatile elements of the auditing environment.
In the early part of this century, this legal
relationship was one which was limited to the individual
client and a chosen accountant (i.e., the accountantstatement user relationship was totally contractual).
Management hired the public accountant as only one more in
the series of controls designed to assure the proper func
tioning of the employees of the firm.

The primacy of this

accountant-client relationship was so significant in 1931 >
that Justice Cardozo was led to say, ” . . .

public

accountants are public only in the sense that their
services are offered to anyone who chooses to employ
them.
■'-Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and
Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
1

The relationship between the accountant and third
party statement user was not given significant considera
tion until 1930.

Soon after the securities frauds

of the late twenties and early thirties were revealed,
the economic sector realized that this "secondary" rela
tionship was one of extreme importance.

At this point,

even Congress recognized that without independent profes
sional assistance issuers of securities could not be relied
upon to provide adequate information for purposes of in
vestment,

The ' :

Congress sought to institutionalize

certain professionals as the public’s first line of defense
through the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2

The certified public

accountant was to become a major component of that line of
defense.
Since the passage of the Securities Acts, the
relationship existent between the public accountant and
third party investors has become steadily more important.
The continued growth and expansion of industry, the grow
ing complexity of business relations and the increasing
specialization of business functions have all forced the
investor to rely upon the representations of accounting
specialists.^

As recently as 1958, there were only nine

^Theodore Sonde, "The Responsibility of Profes
sionals Under Federal Securities Laws— Some Observations,"
Northwestern University Law Review 60 (March-April, 1973)*2.
^Texas Tunneling Company v. City of Chattanooga,
204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), re v ’d 329 F. 2d 402
(6th Cir. 1964).

3
million Americans involved in stock investments.

By 1968,

that figure had increased to more than twenty-four mil
lion. **

The 1970*s have seen a continued growth of indi

vidual involvement in stock transactions.

Recent estimates

indicate that nearly thirty-one million persons are
involved in some form of stock investments.5

These figures

only serve to exemplify the fact that the number of indi
viduals affected by the accountant’s opinion has increased
greatly.
The extent of the necessary relationship between
the accountant and third parties has grown throughout
this century.

Today, the third party investor is the

primary user of the financial statements examined by the
certified public accountant.

If not for the requirements

of the third party statement user there would be little or
no need for the protection provided by the services of the
independent auditor.^
Yet, this increase in the reliance placed on the
auditor’s examination has brought with it problems for the
public accountant.

As the third party statement user

became a more significant consideration for the auditor,
**Arthur M. Louis, "The Accountants are Changing
the Rules," Fortune 127 (June 15, 1968):177.
^Paul LeBlanc, "Accounting as a Consumer Protector,"
Business Lawyer 27 (November, 1971):76.
^Nicholas D. Tellie, "Auditor’s Liability to Third
Parties," Loyola Law Review 17 (1970-1971):358.

legal suits, based on the negligence of some accountants,
and instigated by third party investors, became a more
significant problem for the public accounting profession
as a whole.7
Any attempt to determine the exact number of cases
presently involving public accountants and third party
statement users would necessitate an examination of the
dockets of all civil courts in this country.

Such a survey

would be highly impractical for two reasons.

First, if the
1
data obtained— the number of presently pending cases— were
viewed in relation to the effort expended, the results

would seem highly counterproductive.

The actual value

of the data to be obtained by such a study is somewhat
questionable.

Second, the results obtained in such studies

would be highly questionable as a quantification of the
accountant-third party legal relationship.

For one reason

or another, many suits which would be instigated by a
third party are settled out of court.8

Thus, an attempt

to quantify the number of presently pending cases would
fail to include all those cases which never reach the
courtroom.

Nevertheless, several authors have undertaken

7Ibid., pp. 357-358.
g
Edward J. Daus, "Accountants' Liability Today,"
New York Certified Public Accountant 37 (November, 1967):
835.
An example of this situation is provided by the Mills
Factor Corporation which collapsed in 1968. Lybrand, Ross,
Montgomery reportedly settled this potential suit out of
court for an estimated $4.95 million. Robert D. Hershey,
Jr., "Lawyer Assails Attack on CPA's," New York Times,
1 May 1971, p. 41.

partial studies of the significance of this problem.
These studies, in general, produce two conclusions.
First, most of the limited surveys indicate that the
actual number of cases, and the pecuniary damages involved,
are significant.

A survey conducted over the 1966-1967

period concluded that there were between eighty and one
hundred cases pending involving damages of no less than
twenty million dollars.9

a later survey which was specifi

cally limited to the firm of Peat, Marwick and Mitchell
found that firm to be involved in twenty-eight suits with
damage claims of approximately twenty million dollars.10
A second general conclusion reached by most
studies is that the degree of accountant-statement user
legal Involvement is increasing.

One general study

produced the conclusion that there were as many lawsuits
brought against accountants in the 1967-1968 period as in
the twelve immediately preceding years.11

This conclusion

is backed by a study of a specific underwriting firm
which was involved in only forty-four eases in 1964.

By

1968, this figure had grown to seventy-seven, and by 1969,
it had reached eighty-three.
^Daus, pp. 835-836.
10Lee Berton, "CPAs Under Fire: Auditors' Critics
Seek Wider, Faster Action In Reform of Practices," Wall
Street Journal, 15 November 1966, p. 13.
11Louis.
12Harry R. Weyrich, "Exposure to Professional
Liability," New York Certified Public Accountant 40 (July,
1970):56l.

This increase in the number of legal actions
involving public accountants would seem to be definitely
related to two major factors.

First, there has been a

considerable increase in the reliance of third parties on
the financial statements prepared by certified public
accountants.

Second, there has been a considerable

liberalization of the courts' attitude toward the use of
class actions by financial statement

users.

13

While the

relationship between these factors and increased litigation
seems obvious, the actual legal situation in which the
accountant is involved is not quite so evident.

A discus

sion of the theoretical problems underlying the accountantthird party legal situation follows.
Statement of Problem
With regard to his potential liability to third
party financial statement users, the public accountant is
faced with two problems of major legal significance.

First,

when considering the service areas from which third party
liability may arise, the accountant is presented with a
situation which is shrouded by a great deal of judicial
uncertainty.

Second, and probably more important, when

attempting to determine the conditions under which third
party recovery will be granted by the courts, the account
ant is forced to analyze a number of legal precedents
13r . James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July,
197^):1214.

which contribute to an almost incomprehensible maze of
judicial theory.

A basic discussion of these two problems

follows.
The Judicial Interpretation of
Professional Responsibilities
Traditionally, the audit services performed by the
public accountant, the financial statements examined in
the course of those services and the opinion expressed on
the fairness of those financial statements were the primary
links between the accountant and third party financial
statement users.

The investor, in most cases, is forced

to rely upon the audit report in making his investment
decisions.12*

The failures of the accountant in preparing

this report were initially the greatest source of both
potential harm for the third party statement user, and
potential legal responsibility for the public accountant.
While the audit services, as defined by professional
standards, would seem to be the logical basis of all legal
responsibility, recent court decisions have broadened the
scope of the accountant's legal involvement.
Some recent judicial attent5.cn has centered on the
issue of the auditor's responsibilities in dealing with
information obtained subsequent to the performance of the
actual audit services.

Prior to 1967 > there had been

little or no attention given to this subject area, but at
that time, the significance of the issue was realized.
l2*Daus, p. 835*

Since this realization, the courts have recognized that
when the accountant has reason to believe that statement
users are relying on an audit report which is untrue, that
accountant has a legal obligation to correct that

report.

15

Thus, even if the accountant feels that his audit report
was correct at the date of issuance, the negation of this
belief by subsequently acquired information imposes upon
him an obligation to disclose that information to the third
party statement user.
Accountants' legal liability for the detection of
corporate fraud has provided the courts another opportunity
for comment.

While the accounting profession has always

argued that accountants cannot be expected to detect
fraudulent activity on the part of corporate

insiders,^

the courts have shown a tendency toward imputing more
exacting standards to the activities of public accountants.
As the courts have begun to apply these more exacting
standards, they have also begun to hold the accountant to a
level of legal responsibility concomitant with these new
requirements.

Thus, accountants have recently been held

liable to third party statement users for failing to detect
the existence of fraud. ^
15See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); and Sonde, pp. 17-18.
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Statement on Auditing Standards (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973)» PP* 2-317Hochfelder v. Ernst and Ernst, 503 F. 2d 1100 (7th
Cir. 197*0 •

The preparation of unaudited financial statements
has created a third new area of legal concern for the
certified public accountant.

Traditionally, it was assumed

that the standards of the accounting profession would
guide the courts in the placement of liability.

It

followed from that assumption that accountants had no legal
responsibility when dealing with unaudited write-up work,
since the accounting profession did not require any tech
niques of verification to be applied to the preparation of
such statements.

This feeling of total insulation from

third party suits was soon to be destroyed.
In 1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max Rothenberg and
C o m p a n y (1136 Tenants) the court held that under
recently espoused concepts of negligence liability, an
accountant may be held responsible for injury suffered
by third parties due to the use of unaudited financial
statements.

Courts have reasoned that if accountants, for

any reason, fail to detect fraud which has occurred in the
business activity of the firm, an innocent third party may
be unnecessarily harmed.

This reasoning led the court in

1136 Tenants to conclude that, if certain other conditions
are met, the fact that financial statements are unaudited

1 fi

1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max Rothenberg and
Company, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (1971).

10
does not bar a third party from seeking recovery from the
public accountant.^9
As the financial world becomes more complex, and
investors become more sophisticated, the demand for infor
mation concerning the financial position of the firm
becomes greater.

Ultimately, potential investors will

demand information concerning the current value of a
firm's assets,20 and forecasts of the firm’s future financial position.

21

If the trends of the past hold true,

there will be a need for independent verification of
these new pieces of information to protect the public from
unfair manipulation.

The public accountant will probably

provide a major source of this independent verification.
If at the same time, current legal trends hold true, the
areas of forecasted and current value financial statements
may soon represent a major part of the legal problems of
the certified public accountant.
When the accountant was held legally responsible
for his actions in the performance of audit services, there
-^j. Michael Murphy, "Notes and Comments:
Accounts
and Accounting: The Responsibilities of CPA's Imposed by
Law and by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants," Oklahoma Law Review 26 (August, 1973):385388

.

20Harold J. Trlenens and Daniel U. Smith, "Legal
Implications of Current Value Accounting," Financial
Executive 40 (September, 197*0 :**6.
21John C. Burton, "An Educator Views the Public
Accounting Profession," Journal of Accountancy 122
(September, 1971):51*

11
existed a great deal of agreement between the standards
set for him by the courts and those established by his
profession.

As the judiciary became more liberal, by

Imposing liability for services beyond the performance of
the traditional audit function, a gap appeared between the
legal and professional standards established for public
accountants.

This gap creates a great deal of confusion

as to the professional responsibilities of the accountant,
and thus, contributes to a severe judgemental problem.
The Judicial Interpretation of
Liability Placement
Even if the public accountant is capable of
determining which of his specific undertakings are to be
subject to judicial review, the accountant is faced with
a second, and possibly more significant, problem.

At

present, there is no substantial body of law available
to deal with the conditions governing the legal boundaries
of the accountant-third party relationship.

While there

have been many decisions advanced over the past one hundred
years, there has been almost no agreement as to a single
concept of liability placement.22

There are many rudimen

tary concepts, but when these are integrated into the
system of civil law, constantly changing doctrines of
accountants* liability are obtained.

At this time, there

exist no less than six major concepts of liability place
ment which are potentially applicable to cases of
22Daus, p. 836.

12
accountant-third party litigation,

A brief outline of

these concepts, and their relation to the problem of
accountants' third party responsibility, follows.
The earliest, and most universally accepted, legal
concept which has been applied to the area of accountants'
liability to third party statement users is that of
liability for fraudulent misrepresentation.

As early as

1889, the English Courts, in the case of Derry v. Peek23
(Derry), recognized the existence of an action based in
deceit.

Such an action allowed an injured, yet innocent,

third party a means of recovery when a fraud was perpeph
trated against him. n Yet, the Derry Court made it very
clear that the fact that the defendant misrepresented
his position was not in itself sufficient grounds to
justify recovery.

25

Beyond the basic misrepresentation,

it must be shown that the defendant intended to deceive,
and thus, inflict harm upon the third party.

P

The American Courts were quick to establish the
basic distinction pointed out in Derry.

The courts

23Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889).
P 2l

“^Richard C. Rastetter, Jr., "Torts— Accountants are
Liable to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation
when Both the Nature of the Transaction and the Group to
Which the Third Party Belongs are Known to the Accountant,"
Drake Law Review 20 (January, 1971):412.
25

^Derry.

Pfi

William L. Prosser, "Misrepresentation and Third
Parties," Vanderbilt Law Review 19 (March, 1966):233.

13
immediately distinguished between fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation, and thus, barred recovery in the latter
of the two situations.

jt is the concept of fraudulent

misrepresentation— inclusive of its required element of
intent— which has been universally applied by the American
Courts to the area of accountants' third party liability.
Unfortunately for the public accountant, when the courts
attempt to define the liability of accountants in situations
which involve something less than pure fraud, the doctrines
of liability placement are less than universally accepted,
and often, become confused and incomprehensible.
If the public accountant is guilty of only
negligence in the performance of his services (i.e., if
he does not intend to deceive the third party statement
user) a twofold legal problem develops.

First, the

judicial system must determine the degree to which the
accountant was negligent.

Second, the system must deter

mine the type of relationship which existed between the
accountant an the third party statement user.

These two

factors, and the interpretations of them used by particular
courts, contribute greatly to an already perplexing
situation.
One of the two major types of negligence which may
be committed by the accountant is termed "gross negligence".
In rendering its decision, the Derry Court made a major
2?See Rastetter, p. 412; and Landell v. Lybrand, 264
Pa. 4o6, 197 A. 783 (1919).

distinction between this type of misrepresentation and
ordinary negligence.

The court argued that pure fraud

required an element of direct intent on the part of the
defendant; yet, certain unintended actions could constitute
gross negligence, and thus, be used an an inference of
fraud on the part of the defendant.

If an individual

makes a statement which he knows will be relied upon by
others, there exists an obligation to exercise care in
the making of that statement.

If the statement is made

recklessly, or without care as to its truth or falsity;
if the maker of the statement has no reasonable grounds
for believing that statement to be true, he will be held
liable to the third party for his gross negligence as if
he had been guilty of pure fraud.2®

This concept of

gross negligence as the equivalent of fraudulent misrep
resentation was later to be institutionalized by the New
York Court as a viable cause of action against public
accountants .2^

Yet, different courts have attached

different meanings to the term gross negligence, thus
further contributing to the problems inherent in the area
of accountants’ legal liability.
When the courts determine that the public account
ant is not guilty of gross negligence, the issue of lia
bility is still far from concluded.

Over the years, four

pQ

*°Derry.
2^See Rastetter, p. 413; and Ultramares; and State
Street Trust Company v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d
416 (1938).

15
doctrines of liability placement in cases of "simple or
ordinary negligence" have evolved.

Each of these four

legal doctrines is inherently dependent upon the relation
ship which exists between the accountant and third party.
An outline of each of the potentially applicable doctrines
follows.
In many early decisions— none of which involved
accountants— the general rule was established that privity
of contract (the existence of a contractual relationship)
was a necessary element of any legal action based on
simple negligence in the performance of a contract.3°

By

1931, the year of the New York Court’s first ruling on the
issue of accountants’ third party liability, the concept
of privity as a prerequisite to recovery had diminished
greatly in terms of its legal significance.

This decline

in the importance of the privity doctrine was summarized
quite well by Justice Cardozo when he said, " . . .

the

assault upon the citadel of privity is proceding in these
days apace."31 Yet, it was in that very case that Cardozo
reinstated the concept of privity of contract as a major
legal doctrine.

In his first comment on the issue, Cardozo

imposed privity as a legal barrier between an injured third
party statement user and a negligent accountant.32
3°Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
3^Ultramares.
32pro sser, p. 231.

While Cardozo asserted the lack of privity of
contract between the plaintiff and defendant as the
Court's reason for prohibiting the recovery of pecuniary
losses, most analysts feel that there was a further factor
motivating the court's decision.

The court recognized

that the services of public accountants were a social
necessity; furthermore, the court believed that the exten
sion of liability to third parties in cases of simple
negligence would create liability of such a great amount
as to potentially ruin the accounting profession.

This

fear of the extension of potentially ruinous liability
in cases of ordinary negligence would seem to be the true
reason for the direction of the New York Court's initial
decision.33
No matter what reason is accepted as the basic fac
tor in the New York Court's decision, the lack of privity
of contract was established as a barrier between third
parties and negligent accountants.

This concept of

liability placement remained relatively unscathed until
the i960's.3^

At that time, a reanalysis of prior dicta

produced some attempts at modifying the New York Rule.
As early as 1922, the New York Court recognized
that the privity concept was not an all encompassing legal
33Rozny v. Marnul, 43 111. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 656
(1969).
3^Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and
Attorneys:
Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame
Lawyer 47 (Fall, 1972):593.

doctrine.

In Glanzer v.

S h e p a r d 35

(Glanzer) the New York

Court saw fit to extend an obligation beyond an existent
contract, to a third party.

The court reasoned that

because the defendant knew that his services were to
primarily benefit the third party, an obligation did exist.
When the third party is "the end and aim of the transaction
a relationship equivalent to that of privity of contract
exists and recovery for negligent misrepresentation should
be

granted.

3^

Yet, for many years courts passed over this

concept of primary benefit by ruling it inapplicable to
the area of accountants’ liability to third party statement
users.
It was not until the late sixties that the concept
of primary benefit was applied by the judiciary to the
area of accountants’ liability.

At that time, several

courts postulated that when the accountant specifically
knew the third party, and when the public accountant
specifically knew that his work was to be relied upon by
that third party in making financial decisions, the Glanzer
Rule of primary benefit, and not the Ultramares Rule of
privity of contract should be

applied.

37

Thus, the concept

35Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275

(1922 ).
36tiTorts— Professional Negligence— Accountants may be
Liable to Third Parties for Negligence," Texas Law Review
59 (January, 1972):411.
37see Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969); and
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz,
Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 P. 2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972)
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of primary benefit was advanced as a major Inroad into
the Ultramares Concept of the legal liability of public
accountants for negligence in the examination of financial
statements.
With this one inroad into the precedent of the New
York Court established, several courts were willing to
take the next step toward the institution of more liberal
concepts of accountants’ third party liability.

The

first step toward such a liberalization was the broadening
of the primary benefit rule of Glanzer.

Many courts

sought to eliminate the limitation of the Glanzer Rule,
and therefore, argued that the accountant should be held
liable for his negligence to that class of individuals
which was actually foreseen by the accountant and which
did actually rely upon the misstatement of the public
accountant.38

The general argument which has been

presented by these courts is that a rule which allows
recovery by all members of a specifically foreseen class
more equitably distributes the burden of the misstatement
between the accountant and the third party.39

While the

concept of foreseeability has been generally accepted
^ A r t h u r j. Marinelli, Jr., "The Expanding Scope
of Accountants’ Liability to Third Parties," Case
Western Reserve Law Review 23 (November, 1971): 122.
^^Rusch Factors, Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85 (R.I. 1968).

19
in cases of personal injury, its evolution into the area
of pecuniary loss has been a slow and tedious process.
The final judicial interpretation of the account
a n t ’s liability to third parties for the negligent exami
nation of financial statements is also the most liberal
interpretation.

In 1933 and 1934, Congress instituted the

Securities Acts as measures of protection for the
investing public.

Section 11 of the Securities Act of

1933 imposes upon public accountants civil liability for
the misrepresentation or omission of material facts which
are required to be set forth in the registration state
ment.

In a similar manner, the Securities Exchange Act of

1934 imposes liability for false or misleading statements.^
While the 1934 act requires the third party to prove that
he relied upon the misrepresentation, the 1933 act assumes
the existence of this factor.

The total effect of these

two pieces of legislation, and the administrative rules
promulgated under them, is to impose upon the accounting
profession a virtually unlimited amount of liability
for negligence in the handling of the financial state
ments of registered corporations.
While the Securities Acts were passed in the early
thirties, they had no significant effect on the area of
accountants’ liability until the sixties.

The first

significant case was decided in 1968, and seemed to open
^°Murphy, pp. 389-390.
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a whole new area of legal concern.

In Escott v. BarChris

Construction Corporation**1 (BarChrls) the court used the
provisions of the Securities Acts to hold an accountant
liable for negligence in the performance of his audit
duties.

Thus, the broadest theory of the accountant’s

legal responsibilities became a significant point of
consideration for the certified public accountant.
The accountant can be— and has often been— held
liable to third party statement users for any act ranging
from fraud to simple negligence.

The exact degree of

responsibility can only be determined by a given court at
a given time.

Ultimately, that degree of responsibility

will be directly dependent upon the theory of liability
placement selected and applied by the court.

Therefore,

the accountant is confronted with an ever changing, and
thus, extremely complex situation.
Statement of Purpose
The problem existent in the area of accountants’
liability is a complex one, for at present, there is no
firm basis upon which the accountant may evaluate his
potential legal responsibility to third party statement
users.

The solution to this problem is quite obvious.

There must be established a workable set of rules that the
courts can apply to individual fact situations.

While

several such workable principles are available to the
^■'■Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, 283
P. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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courts, no single concept, or combination of concepts,
has been generally accepted by the courts.2*2
The common law Is not In Itself self-executing;
that Is, legal doctrines may remain dormant for many years
before a single court in a single situation sees fit to
resurrect that concept for application.

For this reason,

the common law cannot be relied upon to produce an effeclio

tive doctrine of accountants’ legal liability. J

Since

the answer to the accountant's problem is not to be found
in the common law, accountants must rely upon some outside
source for any workable solution.
This dissertation attempts to develop a basic
concept of legal liability upon which such a solution may
be based.
are sought.

In striving for this goal two basic definitions
First, an attempt is made to define a mecha

nism which could be employed to reconcile the professional
and legal interpretations of the accountant's responsi
bilities.

Second, this dissertation attempts to define

the conditions necessary for the imposition of third party
liability.

In pursuing this task the goals of equity and

certainty are always kept in mind.

In this way the rights

of both the third party and the accountant are properly
balanced, and the applicable legal doctrines will be
**2Walter J. Coakley, "Accountants' Legal Liability,"
Journal of Accountancy 126 (July, 1968):59*
^ v i c t o r M. Earle, "The Litigation Explosion,"
Journal of Accountancy 129 (March, 1970):65.
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understood by each.

By accomplishing all of these tasks,

the path will be cleared for the development of a single
concept of accountants' third party liability.
Statement of Methodology
In the pursuit of these goals, this dissertation
takes a threefold approach.

First, a study of the litera

ture— both from legal and accounting sources— has been
undertaken in order to gain a basic understanding of the
arguments surrounding the area of accountants' third
party liability.

Second, an examination has been made

of all existent statutes and legal dicta which relate
to the topic of accountants' liability.

Such a study has

revealed the principles and reasoning which currently
underlie the legal theory of accountants' liability.
Finally, a study of other related areas of the law, and
potentially applicable legal doctrines, has been under
taken in an attempt to survey the logic behind doctrines
basic to other areas of the law of torts.

This information

has been used to synthesize the various concepts of tort
law into one formal concept which could govern the area
of accountants' liability to third party statement users.
Summary
The certified public accountant faces a complex and
confusing legal situation when dealing with third party
financial statement users.

Both the decisions and dicta

of the modern courts have added to the legal problems of
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the public accountant.

The courts have not only commented

on the degree of liability which governs specific types
of accountant-third party relationships, but have also
commented on the duties and practices of the accounting
profession as a whole.
This dissertation attempts to find a solution to
the complex legal problems facing public accountants.

In

pursuing this goal a four step approach has been taken.
First, the historical development of the concepts which
today govern accountants' legal liability is traced.
Second, a detailed analysis of the current legal situation
is provided.

Third, the major arguments surrounding the

area of accountants' third party liability are discussed.
Finally, a set of basic concepts to govern the accountantthird party relationship is developed.

Such a systematic

approach to the problem yields a useful and workable
solution to the legal problems of the public accounting
profession.

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OP
ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY
The legal liability of certified public account
ants to third party statement users has its roots in two
separate and distinct bodies of law.

While the common

law doctrines of accountants' legal liability developed
first, statutory liability, as codified in the securities
legislation of the thirties, has also played a major
role in the evolution of the accountant's current legal
predicament.

This chapter takes a two step approach

in tracing the historical development of the concepts of
accountants' legal liability.

The first section of this

chapter traces the evolution of the concepts which today
form the basis of accountants' common law liability to
third parties.

The second section of this chapter

traces the evolution of the statutes which combine with
common law doctrines to form the entire basis of the
accountant's third party legal liability.
Development of Accountants' Common
Law Liability
It was once argued, by Justice Holmes, that the
common law had inherent in it an element of certainty.
2k
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Yet, the ease by case nature of the common law, which
continually allows Individual courts to make changes and
accommodations, has often turned this supposed element
of certainty into a myth.1

This same case by case system

of accommodation and change was the legal entity which
eventually produced the common law doctrines to govern
the relationship existent between the certified public
accountant and the financial statement user.
The specific common law doctrines which were to
be applied to the accountant-third party relationship
developed in several stages.

First, there were the early

English Cases which dealt with the basic concepts of tort
and contract law.

The concepts developed in these cases

were later to provide the theoretical foundation upon
which accountants' common law liability would be admin
istered.

Second, there were the cases in which the

American Courts advanced interpretations of the early
British Theories.

It was here that the early theories

were often modified to deal with particular situations.
Finally, there were the cases which precipitated the New
York Rule.

The development of this rule represented an

attempt on the part of the New York Court to consolidate
the common law of accountants' liability, while, at the
same time, providing for the basic needs of economic
■^Thomas W. Hill, Jr., "The Public Accountants'
Legal Liability .to Clients and Others," New York Certified
Public Accountant 38 (January, 1968):24.
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society.

A discussion of theBe three stages of common

law development follows.

The Early English Doctrines
The first of the English contributions to the
area of accountants’ third party liability was set forth
in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright2 (Winterbottom).
In this case, Lord Abinger ruled that where a person was
injured as a result of the negligent performance of a
contract to which he was not a party, that injured
person had no right of action based upon the contract.
Where there was a lack of privity between the parties,
there was a lack of an existent duty which was a neces
sary element of all actions based upon a charge of negli
gence. 3

in expressing this sentiment, the Winterbottom

Court stated:
There is no privity of contract between these
parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every
passenger, or even any person passing along the
road, who was injured by the upsetting of the
coach, might bring a similar action.
Unless we
confine the operations of such contracts as this
to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can
see no limit, would ensue. . . .
^Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 198, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
^Richard C. Rastetter, Jr., "Torts— Accountants
are Liable to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation
when Both the Nature of the Transaction and the Group
to Which the Thrid Party Belongs are Known to the Account
ant," Drake Law Review 20 (January, 1971):412.
^Winterbottom.
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Thus, the first of the applicable common law concepts—
that of privity of contract— was not the result of any
specific legal doctrine, but instead, was the result of
the court’s belief that the only safe policy to pursue
was that of limiting liability to those who were parties
to a particular contract.^
While the bar of privity of contract as espoused
by the English Courts would seem to have been an absolute
preclusion to third party recovery, the courts were quick
to specify situations in which recovery would be allowed.
In 1889, the English Courts accepted a charge of fraudulent
misrepresentation as the basis of an action.

In Derry

v. Peek^ (Derry) the court recognized the right of a
third party to recover damages caused by the fraudulent
statements of a defendant.

A charge of fraud, according

to the Derry Court, could be based on either false state
ments, or statements made with a reckless disregard for
the truth.'

The court delineated the basis of any such

action by saying:
. . . where a man makes a statement to be acted upon
by others which is false, and which is known by him
to be false, or is made by
him recklessly, or without
care whether it is true or
false, that is, without
any reasonable grounds for believing it to be true,
he is liable in an action of deceit at the suit of
anyone to whom it was addressed or anyone of the
5Ibid.
6Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889).
^Rastetter.
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class to whom it was addressed and who was materially
Induced by the misstatement to do an act to his
prejudice.®
Yet, In defining the limits of an action based on
fraudulent misrepresentation, the Derry Court was careful
to point out the basic distinctions which existed between
actionable fraud and other nonactionable torts.

In

doing so, the court stated:
A false statement, made through carelessness and
without reasonable ground for believing it to be
true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily
amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the
honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and
does not render the person making it liable to an
action of deceit.9
Thus, the English Courts began to assault the citadel
of privity by allowing third parties a means of recovery
under certain well defined circumstances.

Yet, this

first assault was a highly qualified one, for before an
action for fraudulent misrepresentation would be accepted
by the courts, the plaintiff was required to prove that
the defendant knew of the falsity of the statement, and
that the plaintiff’s reliance upon the misrepresentation
caused him to suffer injury.

Fraudulent misrepresentation,

therefore, was a valid cause of action, but action for
negligent misrepresentation was still to be precluded
by the bar of privity.
Q
°Derry.
9lbid.
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While some of the major areas of the English
Common Law seem to have been closing In on the public
accountant, there was one area of the law which provided
the accountant with a great deal of legal protection.
When the courts were finally required to define the
limits of the public auditor's responsibility, the
concepts adhered to were no more stringent than those
which the public accountants had established for them
selves.

In two separate decisions, the English Courts

held that public accountants were not guarantors.

The

courts felt that accountants did not provide individuals
with a warranty as to the accuracy of their reports.
Accountants, the courts reasoned, could not be expected
to find every mistake or defalcation, but instead, could
only be expected to apply the skill and care which would
be used by a reasonable and prudent accountant in the
same situation.10

In one of these two English Cases the

court went so far as to specify the duties of the auditor
by saying:
. . . in determining whether any misfeasence or
breach of duty has been committed, it is essential
to consider what the duties of the auditor are. . . .
Shortly they may be stated thus:
It is the duty
of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has
to perform that skill, care, and caution which a
reasonably competent, careful, and cautious auditor
would use. What is reasonable skill, care, and
caution must depend on the particular circumstances
of each case.
An auditor is not bound to be a detec
tive, or, as was said, to approach his work with
10See ln re London and General Bank [1895] 2 Ch.
673; and In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company [1896] 2 Ch.
279.
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suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there
was something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a
bloodhound.
He is justified in believing tried
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed
by the company.
He is entitled to assume that they
are honest, and to rely upon their representations,
provided he takes reasonable care.
If there is
anything calculated to excite suspicion, he should
probe it to the bottomj but in the absence of any
thing of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably
cautious and careful.H
It was this concept as put forth in the early English
Decisions, which institutionalized public accounting as
a skilled profession.

Thus, accountants were afforded

the opportunity to design the legal standards by which
they would be judged.
The nineteenth century English Courts advanced
four concepts which were to play significant roles in the
evolution of accountants' common law liability.

The

concept of privity of contract, the definition of fraudu
lent misrepresentation, the distinction between fraud
and other lesser torts, and the definition of accounting
as a skilled profession were all to be significant factors
in the development of further legal doctrines.

The stage

was thus set for other courts to apply these judicial
theories to some specific fact situations.
The American Interpretations
One of the major factors in the industrial develop
ment of the United States was the ability of the corporate
form of organization to facilitate the separation of
•^Kingston Cotton Mill.
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management and ownership.

As this functional separation

grew, there arose the need for an independent check
on the activities of management.

The accounting profes

sion migrated to this country in an attempt to alleviate
that need.
As the profession moved from England to the United
States, the legal doctrines which had been developed
to govern the accountant-financial statement user relation'
ship became a more significant part of the American Common
Law.

While the American Courts were quick in adopting

the concepts initially developed in the English System,
the courts were also quick to modify and to advance
further interpretations of these basic principles.
In Seaver v. Ransom-1-2 (Seaver) the American Court
noted that several jurisdictions had extended liability
beyond the parties to a contract, to individuals which
the court called "beneficiaries” of the c o n t r a c t . Y e t ,
the Seaver Court made it extremely clear that the general
rule governing such extra-contractual relationships
was the earlier concept of privity of contract.

The

court expressed this feeling by saying:
The general rule, both in law and equity was that
privity between a plaintiff and a defendant is neces
sary to the maintenance of an action on contract. The
consideration must be furnished by the party to whom
l2Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639
(1918).
13Ibid.
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the promise was made.
The contract cannot be enforced
against the third party, and therefore it cannot
be enforced by him.14
One year later, in the case of Landell v. Lybrand1^
(Landell) the American Courts set out to formalize the
distinction between fraud and negligence which the Derry
Court had alluded to several decades before.1^

In

making this basic distinction, the court said:
There were no contractual relations between
the plaintiff and defendants, and, if there is any
liability from them to him, it must arise out of
some breach of duty, for there is no averment that
they made the report with intent to deceive him.
The averment in the statement of claim is that the
defendants were careless and negligent in making
their report; but the plaintiff was a stranger to
them and to it, and, as no duty rested upon them to
him, they cannot be guilty of any negligence of
which he can complain. . . . ' (Italics mine.)
Thus, the Landell Court interpreted the element of intent
to be the major factor of distinction between pure and
actionable fraud and simple and nonactionable negligence.
This distinction would seem to have provided honest
accountants with an insurmountable defense against third
X8
party actions.
l/i

Ibid.

15Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783
(1919).
^Rastetter.
^Landell.
•^Joseph P. Dawson, "Auditors’ Third Party Liability:
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law," Washington Law
Review 46 (1971):675.
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Even as the Seaver and Landell Courts were reas
serting the validity of the early English Theories, other
American Courts were advancing significant modifications
of the basic legal concepts.

This slow process of

modification was eventually to result in a series of
third party actions based on simple negligence.
When Donald C. MacPherson was injured in a defec
tive Buick Motor Car, the process of modification began.
The New York Court in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company1^
(MacPherson) circumvented the concept of privity of
contract, and allowed an injured third party to recover
damages from a negligent manufacturer.

In justifying

its decision, the court referred to the eminent danger
associated with the use of certain products, and thus,
embarked into a new area of manufacturers * product
liability.

The court justified its finding by stating

that:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be
expected.
If to the element of danger then is
added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without
new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully.
Liability for negligence in the manufacture of
a physical product was to be the furthest extension of
■^MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382
(1916).
38Ibid.
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the common law for six years.
Glanzer v. Shepard‘S

Then, in the case of

(Glanzer) the New York Court was

presented with the opportunity to express an opinion
on the liability of a professional for negligence in
the performance of a service.

In the Glanzer Case,

the court imposed upon a weigher of beans an extracontractual duty, extending beyond his employer to a
third party plaintiff.

The court argued that while the

plaintiff, the buyer of the beans, was not a party to
the contract, he was the primary beneficiary of the
contract.

The court expressed its opinion of the duties

of the weigher by saying:
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer
as well as seller in the situation here disclosed.
The plaintiffs’ use of the certificates was not an
indirect or collateral consequence of the action of
the weighers.
It was a consequence which, to the
weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of the
transaction.
Bech, Van Siclen and Company [the
seller] ordered, but Glanzer Brothers [the buyers]
were to use.
The defendants held themselves out
to the public as skilled and careful in their calling.
They knew that the beans had been sold, and that on
the faith of their certificate payment would be
made. . . .22
The Glanzer Case was thought to be the first step toward
allowing third parties to recover pecuniary losses caused
by the negligence of others.2^

This trend toward

21Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275

(1922 ).
22Ibid.
23

Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and Attor
neys:
Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame Lawyer
47 (Pall, 1972):591•

35
liberalization of the laws of negligence was to continue
for another eight years.
The American Courts soon began to supplant the
old English Doctrines with the new, more liberal, concepts
of the Galnzer and MacPherson Courts.

In the case of

International Paper Products v. Erie Railroad Company

Oil

(Erie) the court applied the primary benefit rule of
Glanzer in allowing an injured third party an opportunity
to recover the pecuniary losses which were caused by
a negligent misrepresentation.

Yet, the Erie Court went

one step beyond the Glanzer Decision by delineating the
four basic conditions which were necessary for such
recovery.

First, the court felt that the defendant in

such an action must have had prior knowledge that the
information was desired by the plaintiff for a serious
purpose.

Second, the court found that the defendant must

have had prior knowledge as to the plaintiff's intent
to undertake action based on the information.

Third, the

court ruled that the defendant must have realized that
false information would result in injury to the plaintiff.
Finally, the court argued that the relationship existent
between the parties, disregarding the existence of a
contract, must have been such that in good conscience
the plaintiff had the right to rely on the information,
p li

International Paper Products v. Erie Railroad
Company, 224 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
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and the defendant had the duty to supply the Information
with care.^5
The liberalizations of the common law which
resulted from the decisions in the Glanzer and MacPherson
Cases, and the interpretation of those decisions by the
Erie Court, would seem to have produced serious cracks
in the once impregnable citadel of privity.

The primary

benefit rule as espoused by the Glanzer Court had become
so well entrenched that in 1930, in the case of Doyle v.
Chatham and Phenix National Bank

26

(Doyle), the concept

was applied to the relationship which existed between
a bank and the purchasers of a group of indemnities which
the bank had certified to be completely secured.

By

this time, it seemed that only one further legal step
was necessary to reach the public accountant.
While the early American Courts rarely had an
opportunity to comment on the common law liability of
public accountants, their liberal rulings on other
related matters would tend to indicate a great degree of
receptivity to third party suits.

With the basic doc

trines of the American and English Courts established,
it remained for the New York Court to fashion these
various legal theories into a unified approach to the
25Ibid.
P

Doyle v. Chatham and Phenix National Bank, 224
N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
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accountant’s common law liability to third party financial
statement users.
The New York Rule
While the first three decades of the twentieth
century provided the courts with a number of opportunities
to comment of the liability of professionals to third
parties, public accountants were the subject of few of
these cases.

Yet, the financial collapse of 1929,

brought with it not only an increase in the awareness
of the certified public accountant’s role, but also, an
increase in the belief that public accountants were
infallible detectives.

This over dependency on the

reports of public accountants soon provided the courts
with the opportunity that had been lacking for almost
thirty years.
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and
27
Company ' (Ultramares) represents the first case in
which the courts attempted to develop a set of legal
doctrines which could govern the liability of public
accountants for losses suffered by third parties and
caused by the negligence, or fraud, of the accountant.
Eight years later, the decision advanced in State Street
Trust Company v. E r n s t (State Street) joined Ultramares
2^Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and
Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
Q

State Street Trust Company v. Ernst, 278 N.Y.
104, 15 N.E. 2d 4l6 (1938).

to form a solid base of common law precedent (the New
York Rule) which would control the area of accountants1
liability to third parties for more than twenty-five
on
years.^
The Ultramares Court took quick action to put
a halt to the progressive trend which had been started
by the courts in MacPherson, Glanzer, Erie and Doyle.
In refusing to extend the liberal doctrines any further,
the Ultramares Court specified only two situations in
which an injured third party could recover damages from
a public accountant.

In the first situation, a third

party could recover damages from the accountant if it
could be proven that the accountant was fraudulent in
making the misrepresentation.

In the second situation,

the third party could recover damages from the accountant
if it could be proven that the third party was both the
primary beneficiary of the accountant's contract, and
specifically known to the public accountant.^°

The

existence of either of these situations was to be a
question of fact, and thus, was subject to the decision
of a jury.
The reassertion of the old privity doctrine by
the Ultramares and State Street Courts constituted a
2Q

Henry B. Reiling and Russel A. Taussig, "Recent
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," Journal
of Accountancy 130 (September, 1970)r^O.
^°Don Collier, "Negligence— Accountants are Liable
to Third Parties for Failure to Exercise Reasonable Care,"
Texas Tech Law Review 3 (Fall, 1971):213-214.
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significant limitation in the progression of the law
of n e g l i g e n c e . Yet, the courts did offer to the injured
third party two significant expansions of the law of
fraud.

First, the scope of the accountant's liability

for fraudulent misrepresentation was expanded to include
those parties who would foreseeably rely upon the account
ant's certification.

Prior to the Ultramares and State

Street Decisions, professionals had been held responsible
only to the parties who were intended to be influenced
by the fraudulent action.

Second, the laws governing

fraudulent misrepresentation were expanded to allow a
jury to draw an inference of fraud from evidence which
only proved the gross negligence of the certified public
accountant .

As Judge Finch pointed out in the State

Street Decision:
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties,
even where there is lacking deliberate or active
fraud. A representation certified as true to the
knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there
is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion
based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion
that there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all
sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal to
see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful,
if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading
to an inference of fraud so as to impose liability
for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance
sheet.
In other words, heedlessness and reckless
^ L e o n a r d Mentzer, "Accountant's Common Law Liability
to Third Persons for Misrepresentation," California Law
Review 57 (1969):28l.
32"Torts— Professional Negligence— Accountants
may be Liable to Third Parties for Negligence," Texas
Law Review 50 (January, 1972):412.
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disregard of consequence may take the place of
deliberate intention.33
This interrelationship between the law of gross negligence
and the law of fraud was to constitute a most complex
doctrine of common law liability.
Although the plaintiffs in Ultramares asked the
court to apply the previously espoused concepts of
Glanzer, Erie and Doyle, the court proceded to delineate
several fine distinctions which precluded the application
of the earlier doctrines.

In distinguishing the Glanzer

and Ultramares Cases, the court argued that the relation
ships existent between the parties to the suits were
different in the two situations.

In explaining these

differences, the Ultramares Court said:
Here [Glanzer] was something more than the rendi
tion of a service in the expectation that the one
who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter
in the operations of his business as occasion might
require. Here [Glanzer] was a case where the
transmission of the certificate to another was not
merely one possibility among many, but the 'end and
aim of the transaction,' as certain and immediate
and deliberately willed as if a husband were to
order a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a
telegraph company, contracting with the sender of
a message, were to telegraph it wrongly to the damage
of the person expected to receive it . . . The
bond was so close as to approach privity, if not
completely one with i t . Not so in the case at hand
[Ultramares]. . . .34
This policy of distinction, based on the relationship
existent between the parties, was continued with respect
^ S t a t e street.
3^Ultramares.
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to the Erie Decision.

In explaining this distinction,

the Ultramares Court said:
Here [Erie] was a determinate relation, that of
bailor and bailee, either present or prospective,
with peculiar opportunity for knowledge on the part
of the bailee as to the subject-matter of the state
ment and with a continuing duty to correct if
erroneous.
Even the narrowest holdings as to the
liability for unintentional misstatement concede
that a representation in such circumstances may be
equivalent to a warranty. . . .35
The process of distinction was brought to a close with
Justice Cardozo’s comment on the Doyle Case.

The

Ultramares Court pointed to the basic differences in
circumstances by saying:
• • • [Doyle] is even more plainly indecisive.
A
trust company was a trustee under a deed of trust
to secure an issue of bonds.
It was held liable
to a subscriber for the bonds when it certified
them falsely. . . .36
The primary beneficiary relationship of Glanzer, the
prospective bailor-bailee relationship of Erie and
the trustee-subscriber relationship of Doyle were the
legal distinctions advanced to justify the change in
direction which was taken by the Ultramares Court.

Yet,

further analysis would tend to indicate that the New
York Rule was predicated more upon social considerations
than legal distinctions.37
35ibid.
36lbid.
37R0zny v. Marnul, 43 111. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 2d 656
(1969).
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When examined in the light of earlier common
law decisions, the rulings in Ultramares and State Street
seem slightly inconsistent.

Legal precedent would have

dictated the imposition of liability in both of these
cases.33

Yet, beyond the basic legal considerations,

Justice Cardozo advanced three extra-legal arguments
to justify the establishment of the New York Rule.
First, while the courts advanced the lack of privity
as the reason for the Ultramares and State Street Decisions,
the fear of an indeterminate liability weighed heavy
on the minds of the jurists.

The Ultramares Court felt

that the imposition of legal liability in this particular
case would place upon the entire accounting profession
an enormous amount of legal pressure.

The court further

believed that this legal pressure would ultimately result
in the financial collapse of public accounting, and thus,
the loss of a valuable discipline.39

Justice Cardozo

expressed this fear by saying:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless
slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class.
The hazards of a business conducted on these
terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether
a flaw may not exist in the imposition of^a duty
that exposes to these consequences. . . .
OQ
"Torts— Negligence— Accountant Held Liable to a
Third Party Not in Privity," The University of Kansas
Law Review 22 (Winter, 1974):292.
39Miller, p. 603.
^Ultramares.
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Second, the courts in Ultramares and State Street
seemed to believe that if third party liability for
negligent misrepresentation were extended to the account
ing profession, the same degree of legal responsibility
would soon be applied to all other skilled professions.
Lawyers, architects and engineers would soon be subject
to the same "indeterminate'1 liability as accountants.**1
The Ultramares Court expressed its fear of this almost
certain result by saying:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this
case will extend to many callings other than an
auditor's.
Lawyers who certify their opinion as
to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds,
with knowledge that their opinion will be brought
to the notice of the public, will become liable to
the investor, if they have overlooked a statute or
a decision, to the same extent as if the controversy
were one between client and advisor. Title companies
issuing titles to a tract of land, with knowledge
that at an approaching auction the fact that they
have insured will be stated to the bidders, will
become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit
of a policy without payment of a premium. These
illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go
little, if any farther than we are invited to go
now. . . .42
Finally, the Ultramares and State Street Courts
expressed the belief that the services of public account
ants were provided primarily for the benefit of their
clients.

The Ultramares Court expressed its view of the

"public" in public accounting by saying that:
. . . public accountants are public only in the
sense that their services are offered to any one
^ G a m m e l v. Ernst and Ernst, 72 N.W. 2d 364 (Minn.
1955).
2ip

ncUltramares.

who chooses to employ them. This is far from saying
that those who do not employ them are in the same
position as those who do.43
Thus, it would seem that these three considerations of
social policy, and not pure legal precedent, served
as the basis of the New York Rule.
The English Courts began the development of the
common law liability of public accountants by delineating
a set of basic legal principles.

While these principles

did not constitute a complete doctrine of common law,
they did supply a foundation upon which other doctrines
could be built.

The American Courts began this building

process just after the turn of the century.

It was here

that the basic English Concepts were interpreted, and
finally modified into a set of legal doctrines which
could be applied to the area of accountants' liability.
Thirty years later, the New York Courts began the process
of balancing these legal concepts with the basic concepts
of social need.

This balancing process was to result in

the promulgation of the New York Rule— a concept which
was to govern the common law liability of public account
ants to third party financial statement users for many
years to come.
Development of Accountants' Statutory Liability
As the twentieth century began, the activities of
most business enterprises were both expanding and
43Ibid.
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differentiating.

While the ordinary citizen’s involvement

in the world of commerce had become more intense, the
average investor had found that it was virtually impossible
to personally obtain all of the information necessary
for the making of economic decisions.

Therefore, the

prudent investor found it desirable to rely upon informa
tion procured, and verified, by other parties.

The public

accountant was to be one of those other parties.
While the investing public was making the necessary
transition, most state legislatures, and the United States
Congress, were realizing the significance of this newly
formed relationship.

It was this realization which

spurred most of these law-making bodies toward the enact
ment of specific pieces of legislation.

These pieces

of legislation were passed in an attempt to provide
a firm base of information upon which the entire economic
system might develop.^

This element of statutory control

evolved through three stages.

First, there were the "blue

sky laws" which were enacted by various state legislatures.
Second, there were the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as established by the
United States Congress.

Finally, there were the rules

and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

An historical perspective of each of these

^ U . S . , Congress, House, Securities Exchange Bill
of 1934, H.R. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1934, p. 5.
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statutory mechanisms, and a discussion of their immediate
effects upon the accounting profession, follows.
The State Blue Sky Laws
Prior to 1930, most states enacted some form of
statute in an attempt to prohibit the sale of fraudulent
securities.

While these blue sky laws did not have a

significant effect upon the liability of public accountants
to third party statement users, an examination of their
failings provides some insight into the development of
similar, and more significant, federal legislation.
In general, the blue sky laws which were enacted
by the states failed to control the sale of fraudulent
securities for three reasons.

First, business activity

had evolved to a level where interstate transactions
were ordinary.

Due to this evolution, the smart salesman

could avoid the laws of a specific state by simply staying
out of that state’s jurisdictions.

While the Constitution

did provide for the mandatory extradition of criminals,
a loophold in the law^5 allowed most parties guilty of
^ T h e Constitution states, "A person charged in any
State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which
he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime." U.S., Constitution, art. IV,
sec. 2. Unfortunately for state governments, the courts
interpreted the word "flee" to mean that the individual
must have been present in the state at some prior time.
Thus, if the seller of securities totally avoided the
state where the sale was made, no extradition would be
possible.
Louis Loss, Securities Regulation (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1951), p. 56.

a securities related crime to avoid punishment.

Second,

while most blue sky laws did provide for adequate punish
ment, the legislatures which enacted those statutes
usually failed to provide funds adequate for their proper
enforcement.

It was not uncommon for a poor and weak

agency of the state to face a rich and powerful corpora
tion In a legal battle over the enforcement of blue sky
laws.

The result of such a battle often weakened the

entire structure of the state law.

Finally, many of the

laws passed by the states were simply illusory.

While

most of the state statutes seemed airtight on the surface,
the exemption provisions attached to those statutes
often negated their effect.1^

Thus, it would seem that

the attempts of individual states to regulate interstate
commerce met with utter failure.
The Federal Securities Statutes
The federal government soon realized that the
state statutes would not be effective in controling
securities transactions.

As such, efforts to effectuate

truth in securities transactions through legislative
means began at the national level as early as 1919.

In

that year, the Taylor Bill was introduced to the House
of Representatives.

This particular piece of legislation

was modeled after the English Companies Act, and thus,
would have required companies involved in Interstate
^Loss, pp. 56-58.
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commerce to register their securities with the Treasury
Department.

Furthermore, the bill would have imposed

upon anyone signing the registration statement civil
liability for material misstatements.

One year later,

Representative Volstead sponsored another form of securi
ties legislation.

Unfortunately for the unsophisticated

investor, neither of these bills

was

ever to be reported

out of committee.
It would seem that the stock market crash of 1929
was the force which was necessary to spur Congress toward
the finalization of specific statutes designed to control
the major securities markets.

After that economic collapse,

and several years of the deep depression which followed,
Congress took definite steps to insure that potential
investors would always have the information necessary for
the making of their economic decisions.

These steps

culminated in the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Each of these pieces

of legislation was eventually to have a significant impact
upon the area of accountants’ legal liability to third
party financial statement users.
When Congress implemented the Securities Act of
1933 it seems that the accomplishment of two basic goals
was sought.

First, the statute was designed to provide

investors with necessary financial information.

To

accomplish this purpose, Congress required all affected
^7Ibid. pp. 65-66.
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corporations to file registration statements concerning
the issuance of new securities.

The information contained

in these registration statements was to be sufficient
to allow a prudent investor to make an adequate appraisal
of any new security i s s u e . S e c o n d ,

and probably more

important for the public accounting profession, the
statute sought to establish a force which would deter
the financial abuses which had been so prevalent only
ten years before.

To accomplish this task, the act

imposed civil liability upon anyone making a material
misstatement in the registration of an affected security.
Section 11 specifically imposes such civil liability
upon experts associated with the registration statement
by saying:
In case any part of the registration statement when
such part became effective, contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not mis
leading, any person acquiring such security . . .
may, either at law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, sue . . .
. . . every accountant, engineer, or appraiser,
or any person whose profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, who has with his consent been
named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, or as having prepared or
certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement . . .50
JiO

°Charles H. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Analyzed and Explained (New York: Francis Emory
Fitch, 1934), p. 157.
iiq
^Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corpora
tion, 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
^Securities Act of 1933i U.S. Code, Title
77 (1970T

15s
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Congress soon realized that while the element of
control inherent in the Securities Act of 1933 was
significant, the fact that the control feature only
applied to issues of new securities represented a serious
limitation in the legislative scheme.

To correct this

flaw in the 1933 act, Congress instituted a system of
continuous control through the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193^. ^

The 193^ act was similar to

the earlier legislation in that it provided for both
information dissemination and civil law deterrence.

The

deterrence feature of this particular piece of legislation
was provided in Section 18 which stated:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made
any statement in any application, report, or document
filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regula
tion thereunder . . . which statement was at the time
and in the light of the circumstances under which
it was made false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, shall be liable to any person . . .
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have
purchased or sold a security at a price which was
affected by such statement, for damages caused by
such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge
that such statement was false or misleading .52
While it was almost thirty years before any court
undertook to define the exact liability which these
acts imposed upon the accounting profession, it was
generally accepted that these statutes would impose
upon the certified public accountant liability at least
■^Milton H. Cohen MtTruthin Securities' Revisited,"
Harvard Law Review 79 (1966):13^1.
-^Securities Exchange Act of 193^* U.S. Code,
Title 15, sec. 78r (19/0)7
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as great as that which was barred by Justice Cardozo
just three years

earlier.

53

The Securities and Exchange
Commission Regulations
While Congress felt that the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided an adequate
means of securities regulation, some farsighted members of
the legislature realized that flexible laws were

prerequi

site to controlling a constantly changing financial world.
Thus, Congress established the Securities and Exchange
Commission in an attempt to provide an authoritative body
which would constantly administer the Securities Acts in
such a way as to guarantee investor protection.

One of

the first major rules which was to be promulgated by this
quasi-judicial body— Rule 10b-5— was eventually to have
a significant impact upon the liability of public account
ants to third party financial statement users.
Soon after the passage of the Securities Acts,
the Securities and Exchange Commission realized that it
had little or no power over frauds perpetrated by security
purchasers.

To rectify this situation, the Commission

asked Congress to amend Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1 9 3 3 In 19^2, one year after the unanswered
53william 0. Douglas and George E. Bates, "The
Federal Securities Act of 1933 j " Yale Law Journal 43
(December, 1933):197-198.
^ A r n o l d S. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5
(New York:
Clark Boardman Company, 1974), p. 1-108.
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request for congressional action, the Securities and
Exchange Commission took steps on its own to fill this
gap which existed in its arsenal of protective devices.55
To accomplish this, the Commission adopted Rule 10b-5
which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.56
While the initial promulgation of Rule 10b-5 was perceived
to have little effect upon the accounting profession,
it was to play, in time, a significant role in the develop
ment of accountants' legal liability.
Thus, like the common law of accountants' liability,
statutory law was to emerge through three stages.

First,

there were the blue sky laws which were adopted by the
individual states.

Second, there were the Securities

Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193*1.
While these laws have been quite effective, their impact
^^Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (Mass.
1973).
^ Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5a
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (197*1).
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upon the area of accountants' third party liability has
been a recent phenomenon.

Finally, there were the rules

and regulations instituted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

These regulations were initiated in an

attempt to keep the package of securities related legisla
tion in step with a constantly evolving financial world.
In time, these national securities regulations were to
play a significant role in the determination of accountants'
liability to third party financial statement users.
Summary
Distinct doctrines of accountants' liability to
third party financial statement users have evolved
in two separate areas of law.

The common law doctrines

of accountants' liability began to develop as early as
1842 in England.

The interpretation, development and

modification of these concepts continued for almost one
hundred years.

The statutes which affect the accountant's

legal liability, on the other hand, did not begin to
take shape until the beginning of the twentieth century.
Yet, within a period of fifty years, significant federal
legislation had taken form.

This legislation was later

to play a significant role in the determination of the
accountant's responsibility for injury suffered by finan
cial statement users.
While the common law was the major force in the
early development of accountants' liability, the statutes
and regulations established in the thirties and forties

were to join the common law as significant factors in
years to come.

Chapter three examines this blending of

the law, and in doing so, presents a discussion of the
legal situation which presently confronts the certified
public accountant.

CHAPTER III
THE CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION PACING
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
The legal concepts of accountants’ third party
liability have evolved into a most complex set of judicial
principles.

During the last thirty years, many cases

on the issue of accountants' liability have been decided
by the courts.

Yet, while there

is

a dearth of decided

cases, there is no unified body of law defining the
accountant's responsibilities to third party financial
statement users.

Many of these cases provide doctrines

which could be universally applied to the area of
accountants' liability, but most of the doctrines
established represent the logical conclusion of an
individual court acting in an individual fact situation.
Thus, the available decisions provide the accountant with
only a rudimentary basis upon which to assess his legal
liability.1
This chapter procedes with a discussion of the
legal concepts which have been applied by various courts
■^-Edward J. Daus, "Accountants' Liability Today,"
New York Certified Public Accountant- 37 (November, 1967):
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to the area of accountants' civil liability.

In accom

plishing this task a two step approach has been taken.
First, a discussion of the judiciary's interpretations
of the professional responsibilities of accountants is
presented.

This section of the chapter concentrates on

an analysis of the gap which has developed between the
standards established for the accountant by the courts
and the standards established for the accountant by
the accounting profession.

Second, a discussion of the

judiciary's interpretations of the legal responsibilities
of accountants is presented.

This section of the chapter

concentrates on an analysis of the doctrines of liability
placement which are currently applicable to the accounting
profession.

This two step approach facilitates an under

standing of1 the perplexing legal situation which today
confronts the certified public accountant.
The Public Accountant's Professional
Responsibilities
As early as 1895, public accountants were recognized
by the courts to be members of a skilled profession.2
This judicial recognition brought with it special legal
treatment, for skilled professionals are usually allowed
to establish the legal standards of conduct by which
they will be judged.

These legal standards are often the

same as the standards of conduct set by the profession to
2See In re London and General Bank [1895] 2 Ch.
673; and In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company [1896] 2 Ch.
279.

govern Its members' activities.

This practice of allowing

professionals to set the standards of conduct by which
they will be judged has been generally accepted by the
courts for two specific reasons.

First, this legal

practice was established so that the professionals
themselves would delineate the rules of conduct by which
they would customarily abide.

Second, this legal practice

was established to prevent the courts from overburdening
other professions with liability based on unsophisticated
judgment.3
The judiciary has accepted this concept of selfimposed professional responsibility for many years.
In fact, the concept has become so well entrenched as
to lead one court to assert that, "Accountants should
not be held to a standard higher than that recognized
in their profession.

. . .

Yet, while several other

courts were also asserting the validity of this doctrine
of self-regulation,^ the concept Itself was beginning
to create some major problems for the public accountant.
The special prlvlledge which the courts had extended
to the certified public accountant caused the profession

Paul:

^William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (St.
West Publishing Company, 1971 )> P* 165.

^Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, 283
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
^See Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v.
Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 F. 2d 847 (4th
CIr. 1972); and Hochfelder v. Ernst and Ernst, 503 F. 2d
1100 (7th CIr. 1974).
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as a whole to focus on the audit as the primary source
of legal problems, and thus, begin to take action which
would limit the potential for the realization of that
liability.

As such, the profession began to deny any

responsibility for actions which were beyond the basic audit
examination.

This narrowing of the accountant’s assumed

responsibility continued to such an extent that the
profession eventually asserted that the primary responsi
bility for the fair presentation of financial information
lies not with the public accountant, but instead, with
corporate management.^
Many courts have now concluded that this narrowing
of the public accountant’s assumed responsibilities has
caused a shift in the priorities of the accounting
profession.

These courts have often reasoned that the

public accountant no longer seeks to serve the investor
by presenting fair financial information, but instead,
seeks to protect himself by meeting certain "esoteric"
accounting standards.

This perceived shift in priorities

has led many courts to believe that accountants should
no longer be allowed to determine the standards by which
their conduct will be judged.

As one recent court stated:

Much has been said by the parties about generally
accepted accounting principles and the proper way
for an accountant to report real estate transactions.
We think this misses the point. Our inquiry is
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Statement on Auditing Standards (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973), PP« 1-2.
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properly focused not on whether Laventhol's report
satisfied esoteric accounting norms, comprehensible
only to the initiate, but whether the report fairly
presents the true financial position . . . to the
untutored eye of an ordinary investor. 7
Thus, the courts today are not only finding deficiencies
in the way auditors examine financial statements, but
also, are finding deficiencies in certain accounting
principles, and the way those principles are applied to
specific fact situations.®

A discussion of some of the

major areas of judicial comment follows.
Disclosure of Subsequent Events
Since World War II, the accounting profession,
and the services provided by that profession, have
expanded at a very rapid pace.

Today, the average public

accounting firm supplies to its clients not only the basic
audit service, but also, supplies tax and management
advisory services.

While these additional service areas

provide the accountant with an opportunity to develop
a closer relationship with the client, they also provide
an opportunity to obtain further information concerning
the financial condition of the client firm.

Such

subsequently acquired information can have a significant
effect on the previously expressed opinion of the public
7Hertzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and
Horwath, 1974 CCH Federal Security Law Reports, par.

94574.

®Henry B. Relling and Russel A. Taussig, "Recent
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," Journal
of Accountancy 130 (September, 1970) :4l.

accountant, the action taken by a potential investor
and the legal liability of that accountant to that
investor.

The extent of this potential liability has

been a major question in the past few years.
Initially, the accounting profession argued that
the report issued by a certified public accountant repre
sented the opinion of that accountant on the fairness of
a set of financial statements as of the end of the
audit examination.

Therefore, If the accountant had

complied with accepted auditing standards In the per
formance of his examination, and if the accountant's
opinion had been advanced in good faith, no legal
liability could arise out of that particular engagement.
Even if a subsequent event, or discovery, should change
the auditor’s opinion at some later date, the profession
reasoned that there was no need to disclose this new
information for it had no significance in relation to
the dated audit opinion.

This theory of professional

responsibility was to be eventually challenged by the
judiciary.
Two significant, but isolated, events served as
a prelude to a final decision on the responsibility of
public accountants for the disclosure of subsequently
acquired information.

First, in 1883, the U. S. Second

Circuit Court of Appeals held that one party to a
contract has a duty to correct any misapprehensions
which were affecting the actions of the other party to
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the contract.^

Second, the Securities Act of 1933

imposed upon the accountant a duty to disclose all
information obtained subsequent to the audit, and prior
to the effective date of the registration statement.10
While neither of these events applied to the general
accountant-third party relationship, they did indicate
a trend on the part of the law-making bodies.

This trend

toward the imposition of a duty to disclose subsequent
events was to be the main thrust of the law for many
years,11 but the final decision was not to come until
1967.
In the case of Fischer v. Kletz12 (Fischer) the
court fashioned a rule which drew heavily from those
earlier situations.

It was here that the court ruled

that where there exists reason to believe that people
are continuing to rely on a representation which is not
true, the individual responsible for the representation
must see that it is corrected.1^

The court justified

^Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2nd Cir. 1893).
10In the Matter of Charles A. Howard, E. Harold
DeNoyelles, Elmer W. Maher, William B. Atwater, 1 SEC 6
(1934).
Paul:

■^William L. Prosser, Law of Torts. 2nd ed. (St.
West Publishing Company, 1955), p . 535.
12Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.

1967).
■^Theodore Sonde, "The Responsibility of Professionals
Under the Federal Securities Laws— Some Observations,"
Northwestern University Law Review 68 (March-April, 1973):
17-18.
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the establishment of such a rule of professional responsi
bility by saying:
I can see no reason why this duty to disclose should
not be imposed upon an accounting firm which makes
a representation it knows will be relied upon by
investors.
To be sure, certification of a financial
statement does not create a formal business relation
ship between the accountant who certified and the
individual who relied upon the certificate for invest
ment purposes.
The act of certification, however
is similar in its effect to a representation made in
a business transaction:
both supply information
which is materially and justifiably relied upon by
individuals for decisional purposes. Viewed in this
context of the impact of nondisclosure on the injured
party, it is difficult to conceive that a distinction
between accountants and parties to a business
transaction is warranted.
The elements of 'good
faith and common honesty' which govern the businessman
should also apply to the statutory 'independent
public accountant'.1^
Thus, an accountant who makes a representation which he
knows will be relied upon by third parties is under a
duty to disclose to those third parties any information
obtained subsequent to the initial representation.^5
This was to be the first inroad into the accountant's
right to establish the professional standards by which he
would be judged— by no means was it to be the last.
Detection of Insider Fraud
The rapid growth of the economic sector produced
two basic problems for the public accounting profession.
■^Fischer.
■^J. Michael Murphy, "Notes and Comments: Accounts
and Accounting: The Responsibilities of CPA's Imposed
by Law and by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants," Oklahoma Law Review 26 (August, 1973)*.388.
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First, the growth of corporate entities made it virtually
Impossible for the public accountant to perform a com
plete examination of the financial records of most
corporations.

If the accounting profession as a whole

were to require a complete examination of all financial
records, the result would almost certainly be audit
costs which are prohibitive to most corporate entities.
Second, the growth of corporate entities produced an
atmosphere more conducive to insider fraud.

Since the

public accountant could not examine all financial transac
tions, a group of employees could easily subvert the
audit examination, and thus, defraud the corporation
and the investing public.

16

With these problems contributing to serious
deficiencies in the traditional audit procedures, the
public accountant was forced to rely on tests, samples
and internal control as the basis for the expression of
his opinion.

The accountant soon realized that this

shift in audit procedures made it impossible to guarantee
the detection of all corporate fraud.

This realization

was expressed in the profession’s auditing standards in
the following manner:
In making the ordinary examination, the
independent auditor is aware of the possibility that
fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated
as the result of defalcations and similar irregu
larities, or deliberate misrepresentation by
^Jerry D. Trites and Barry M. Grant, "Set the
Watchdog Free," Chartered Accountant Magazine 106
(January, 1975): 2 k .
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management, or both. The auditor recognizes that
fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his
opinion on the financial statements, and his examina
tion, made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, gives consideration to this
possibility.
However, the ordinary examination
directed to the expression of an opinion on financial
statements is not primarily or specifically designed,
and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations
and other similar irregularities, although their
discovery may result.
Similarly, although the
discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by manage
ment is usually more closely associated with the
objective of the ordinary examination, such examina
tion cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery.
The responsibility of the independent auditor for
failure to detect fraud . . . arises only when such
failure clearly results from failure to comply
with generally accepted auditing standards.17
While the accounting profession has denied any
responsibility for the detection of corporate fraud,
third parties, and certain courts, have argued that the
imposition of such a responsibility upon the profession
is not unwarranted.

These certain courts were to eventu

ally use Section 10(b), and particularly Rule 10b-5, of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as the means for
imposing civil liability for failure to detect corporate
fraud upon the public accounting profession.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the act provide
a broad remedy for persons injured by fraudulent acts
perpetrated in the purchase or sale of securities.
Since these provisions only relate to activities "in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities",
accountants have always felt that they could not be
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
pp. 2-3.
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applied to the members of their profession.-1-®

Yet,

several recent court decisions have suggested that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be applied to certified
public accountants when certain prerequisite conditions
are present.

As one recent court pointed out:

The purpose of the financial statements is to inform
the man on the street and the underlying policy of
the Securities and Exchange Acts and of Rule 10b-5
is to assure that he can have truthful information
in buying securities regardless of the intended
victim of the fraud. Moreover, the defendants have
set themselves up to be independent certified
public auditors. As such, they have assumed a pecul
iar relationship with the investing public. As
accountants, the defendants clearly cannot be immu
nized from suit.19
In general, the courts have advanced five conditions
which must be present before an accountant will be held
liable for aiding and abetting a corporate securities
fraud.

First, it must be demonstrated that the accountant

had a duty to inquire into the financial position of
the firm.

Second, it must be proven that the plaintiff

was a beneficiary of this duty of inquiry.

Third, it

must be shown that the accountant was guilty of a breach
of that duty of inquiry.

Fourth, it must be demonstrated

that the accountant breached a concomitant duty of
disclosure.

Finally, it must be proven that adequate

18
Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., "Foreseeability as a
Determinant of Audit Responsibility," The Accounting
Review 47 (April, 1973):263.
■^Drake v. Thor Power Tool Company, 282 F. Supp.
94 (N.D. 111. 1967).
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inquiry on the part of the accountant would have uncovered
the fraud.20
To prove the existence of these five specific
conditions, the third party plaintiff need not prove
that the accountant acted in a fraudulent manner, or
even that the accountant benefited from the fraud.
Instead, the courts have held that it is sufficient to
show that an aider and abettor knew, or should have known,
that the actions of the primary parties (the purchasers
or sellers of the securities) were being carried out
in violation of Rule 10b-5.

Therefore, an accountant

can be charged with aiding and abetting a 10b-5 violation
if he was negligent in the performance of his audit, and
if this negligence resulted in the accountant's failure
to detect that violation.21
It was this charge of aiding and abetting a
Rule 10b-5 violation which produced a serious difference
in the accounting standards adhered to by the profession
and those adhered to by the courts.

As yet, the extent

of this difference has not been determined, but, fortu
nately for the accounting profession, the Supreme Court
has agreed to define the limits of the accountant's
liability for the detection of fraud sometime during the
^Hoehfelder.
2lArnold S. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5
(New York: Clark Boardman Company, 197 ^ ) » P • 2-70.
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1975 Winter Session.22

Only after such an ultimate legal

definition is attained, will the accounting profession
be able to promulgate professional standards which
conform to the legal standards established by the courts.
Preparation of Unaudited Financial
Statements
Another area in which there are major differences
between the professional standards established by
accounting, and those established by the courts, is the
area of legal responsibility for the preparation of
unaudited financial statements.

With regard to this

area of professional activity, the public accounting
profession has argued that unaudited financial statements
are not the subject of any specific examination processes,
and therefore, cannot be the potential source of any
third party legal responsibility.23

On the other hand,

several recent courts have asserted different interpre
tations of both the accountant's professional duties
and legal responsibilities when dealing with these unau
dited financial statements.
In the case of 1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max
Rothenberg and Company2** (1136 Tenants) the court was
22,lTop Court Will Define When an Auditor is Liable
for Client's Securities Violation," Wa.ll Street Journal,
15 April 1975, p. 4.
2^Murphy, p. 385*
24

1136 Tenants Corporation v. Max Rothenberg and
Company, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (1971).
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presented with its first opportunity to comment on
the liability of public accountants for negligence in
the preparation of unaudited statements.

It was also

here, that the court determined that such third party
liability does exist.

The New York Court reasoned

that theories of negligence liability could be applied
in such a manner as to require a public accountant
to act with reasonable care when dealing with any type
of financial representation.

The court in 1136 Tenants

further reasoned that since negligence on the part
of the accountant will contribute to third party injury
in both audited and unaudited situations, a profes
sional’s duty to third party statement users exists
in either situation.25
While the decision advanced by the 1136 Tenants
Court did have a major impact upon the accounting
profession, the reasoning that the court used in
arriving at that decision has had a more significant
impact upon the professional standards of public
accountants.

The court in 1136 Tenants directly

contradicted traditional accounting standards by arguing
that the accountant has an obligation to perform certain
techniques of verification to determine the fairness
of financial representations, even when that accountant
is dealing with a simple set of unaudited financial
25Murphy, p. 388.
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statements.

One later court Interpreted this basic

contradiction by saying:
Even when performing an unaudited write-up, an
accountant is under a duty to undertake at least
a minimal investigation into the figures supplied
to him. He is not free to disregard suspicious
circumstances.26
Yet, the accounting profession reacted to this
newest intrusion by the courts with arguments, instaed
of their usual acquiescence.

Accountants have advanced

several arguments in an attempt to discredit the 11.36
Tenants Decision.

First, the accounting profession has

argued that the fee charged by Rothenberg for his
services could not have possibly compensated him for the
performance of any verification processes.

Second, the

accounting profession has argued that it is highly
unlikely that Riker (both the embezzler and employer of
Rothenberg) would have hired someone to specifically
uncover his fraudulent activities.

Finally, and most

importantly, the accounting profession has argued that
all of the financial statements issued by the accountants
contained legends which revealed the inherent lack of
verification and examination.2?

Thus, the accounting

^ B l a k e l y v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 267 (Oreg.
1973).
27Michael J. Whaling, "Liability of Certified
Public Accountants— Unaudited Financial Statements-—
Certified Public Accountants Are Liable for Negligence
in Preparation of Unaudited Statements," Notre Dame
Lawyer 48 (December, 1972):495.
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profession has contended that the basis for the decision
in 1136 Tenants was totally unfounded.
Prior to the 1136 Tenants Decision, certified
public accountants were held liable for negligence only
when an opinion was issued as the result of an audit
examination.

While the scope of the accountant’s

liability for audited financial statements has expanded
over the years, the courts had not previously extended
such legal liability to other areas of accounting
services.2®

Yet, in spite of the arguments of the

accounting profession, the 1136 Tenants Decision has
made such an extension.

It would seem that this case

shall remain as a major legal precedent, at least until
another court, acting in a similar situation, sees fit
to overrule this New York Decision.^
Future Trends
While the attest function of the certified public
accountant has been traditionally limited to the expression
of an opinion on a set of audited financial statements,
there has been a great amount of recent discussion
concerning an expansion of the scope of the public
accountant’s examination.

Yet, the recent court decisions

which have held accountants responsible for activities
28Ibid.
2^Norman J. Elliot, "Another View.of the 1136
Tenants’ Corporation Case," Certified Public Accountant
Journal 42 (December, 1972):1005-

71
beyond the limits of their basic professional standards
have caused most accountants to believe that the risks
involved in such an expansion of their work would far out
weigh any benefits which would be derived.

This fear on

the part of the accounting profession is not based upon
pure speculation, but instead, is the result of some recent
decisions which have been promulgated by the courts.
One area of potential audit expansion is that of
attesting to the accuracy of financial forecasts.

Most

financial analysts feel that projections of a firm's
future economic performance are necessary for well informed
investor decisions.

Furthermore, these analysts feel

that if such projections should be presented, some
type of independent verification would be necessary.
The certified public accountant is in a perfect position
to supply this independent verification.

Yet, most

members of the accounting profession are of the opinion
that if examinations of financial forecasts are to become
an inherent part of the audit function, there must be
some special legal treatment associated with these pro
jected figures.

Basically, professionals argue that

since financial forecasts are so speculative, there
should be no legal responsibility for their certifica
tion. 30

Unfortunately for public accountants, the courts

^P h ilip E. Fess and Spencer J. Martin, "Company
Forecasts and the Independent Auditor’s Inexorable
Involvement," Certified Public Accountant Journal 43
(October, 1973):873.
’
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have not seen fit to agree with this line of argumenta
tion.

Instead, the courts have held that projected

financial information constitutes a material fact under
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.31
Therefore, it would seem that accountants could be held
liable for certain failures in the examination of fore
casted financial information.
A second area of potential audit expansion lies
in the preparation of current value financial state
ments.

Here again, the accounting profession argues

that since current value statements are so indefinite,
there must be special legal treatment afforded those
who issue them.

Yet, the courts, again, have taken a

contradictory approach to the problem.

In several

recent decisions, the courts have ruled that current
value financial information is a material fact.32

There

fore, it would again seem that accountants shall be
held legally responsible to third party financial state
ment users for failure to exercise due care in the
examination of current value financial statements.
The problems associated with the appearance of
the professional man in the courts have always been great.
^ H o w a r d J. Trienens and Daniel U. Smith, "Legal
Implications of Current Value Accounting," Financial
Executive 40 (September, 1974):48.
3^See Grestle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Incorporated,
298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); and Speed v. Transamerica Corporation, 99 F. Supp. 808 (Dela. 1951).

Initially, the courts sought to reduce these problems
be allowing skilled professions to establish the standards
by which their members would be judged.

Through this

mechanism, the courts assured professionals that the
standards by which they would be governed in a court of
law would be the same as those by which they would be
governed in the performance of their business activities.
Unfortunately for the accounting profession, some courts
have now discarded this once universally accepted legal
doctrine.

Various courts, commenting on various business

situations, have questioned the reasonableness of certain
generally accepted auditing standards.

These recent

judicial comments have contributed greatly to the exis
tence of a gap between the legal standards by which an
accountant will be judged and the professional standards
by which an accountant will act.
The Courts1 Doctrines of Liability Placement
The doctrines of liability placement which are
today used in determining the accountant’s liability to
third party statement users have evolved over a period
of more than one hundred years.

Yet, even this long

period of evolutionary development has not produced a
concept of liability placement which is generally accepted
by all courts.

While the members of the judiciary have

agreed that two factors— the degree of care exercised
by the accountant, and the relationship which existed
between the accountant and third party— enter into the
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placement of civil liability, the courts have not estab
lished a general relationship between these two factors
and the imposition of legal liability.

This section of

this chapter presents an analysis of the most commonly
accepted doctrines of liability placement.

In so doing,

it is intended that an insight into the legal situation
which presently confronts the certified public accountant
will be gained.
Liability for Pure Fraud
Legal liability to third party financial statement
users for fraud, or intentional deceit, is the oldest
of the concepts of liability placement which have been
applied to members of the public accounting profession.
Furthermore, the concept of legal responsibility for
intentional deceit is the only concept of liability
placement which has been universally accepted by the
courts.

With almost no exception, the American Courts

today hold that an individual who makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law is
liable for the injury suffered by individuals who have
relied upon the misrepresentation.33

Therefore, an

accountant who intentionally deceives the investing
public will be held liable to all of the members of the
general public who were injured due to that accountant’s
deceit.
^American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law
of Torts (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1934), p. 59•

While the courts have accepted a charge of fraudu
lent misrepresentation as a valid basis for actions
against the certified public accountant, they have
generally required that certain underlying conditions
be met before an injured third party will be granted
recovery.

The first of the underlying requirements of

an action based in pure fraud is that of scienter, or
knowledge.

If the accountant is to be charged with

fraudulent misrepresentation, the third party plaintiff
has an obligation to prove that the accountant actually
knew that his representation was false.

if on the

other hand, the accountant is not aware of the fact that
he is deceiving the public, he cannot be charged with
pure fraud, and instead, must be charged with some other,
less actionable, tort.
A second prerequisite to any third party action
based on a charge of fraudulent misrepresentation is that
of intent.

An accountant who makes a fraudulent misrepre

sentation is liable only to those parties whose action
he intended to influence.

While this element of intent

would seem to place a severe limitation on third party
recovery, the limitation is only minor due to several
liberalizations of the law.

First, most courts will

rule that an individual intends a particular result to
occur, if the individual either acts in a way which will
3^William L. Prosser, "Misrepresentation and Third
Parties," Vanderbilt Law Review 19 (March, 1966):233-

cause the result to occur, or acts under the belief
that there is substantial certainty that the result
will occur.

Therefore, accountants are not only liable

for the occurrence of one particular result, but also,
are held responsible for any number of substantially
similar results which might eventually occur.

Second,

the intent of an accountant’s actions is not limited
to its effect on one individual, but instead, extends
to many different groups of individuals.

A fraudulent

misrepresentation made with the intent of inducing more
than one person, or group of persons, to act, subjects
the maker to liability to any of those individuals.35
Therefore, a certified public accountant who makes a
fraudulent misrepresentation is liable to all those
who he should have reasonably foreseen as being injured
by his deceit.36
The final prerequisite to a third party action
based on a charge of fraudulent misrepresentation is
that of reliance.

The third party plaintiff must be

able to prove that he both relied upon the fraudulent
misrepresentation of the accountant, and that this
reliance was justified.

For a third party to prove

reliance on a financial representation, that third party
^American Law Institute, pp. 71-74.
-^Rusch Factors, Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85 (R.I. 1968).
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need only show that the financial representation had
a significant impact upon his final course of action.37
On the

other

hand, proving

is not

quite

so easy.

that this reliance was justified

To prove that his reliance was justifiable, the
third party must prove two independent facts.

First,

the third party plaintiff must be able to prove that
the fact misrepresented by the public accountant was a
material one.

To accomplish this task, the third party

must show that the misrepresented fact was one to which
a reasonable man would attach significance.

Second,

the third party plaintiff must show that he had no
knowledge as to the falsity of the misrepresentation.
If the

third

party either knew,

of the

false

nature of the

or should haveknown,

representation, hisreliance

was not justifiable, and therefore, liability for
fraudulent misrepresentation cannot

e x i s t .

38

When a third party financial statement user is
capable of proving scienter, intent and reliance, the
courts will hold accountants liable for fraudulent mis
representation.

Yet, while pure fraud has become an

accepted basis for legal action, the difficulty involved
in proving such a charge has made such actions a rarity.39
37American Law Institute, p. 106.
33ibid., pp. 84-86.
■^Joseph p .
Dawson, "Auditors’ Third Party Liability:
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law," Washington Law
Review 46 (1971):676.
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Therefore, the courts have turned to some more liberal
doctrines of liability placement when dealing with
members of the public accounting profession.
Liability for Gross Negligence
While the traditional third party action for
deceit was based in fraud, the courts soon realized
that the requirements of scienter, intent and reliance
were overly strict in relation to the situation with
which they were dealing.

As the attitude of the courts

began to shift toward a more favorable view of third
party litigation, the idea of gross negligence as an
inference of fraud began to seep into the law of account
ants' liability.1*®

This idea of gross negligence as a

replacement for certain of the fraud requirements was
to represent a significant expansion of the law of fraudu
lent misrepresentation.
Gross negligence, or constructive fraud, consists
of a false representation which induces a third party
to take action detrimental to his well b e i n g . W h i l e
a charge of pure fraud would require definite proof of
the existence of each of the prerequisite factors, a
charge of gross negligence requires proof of only a
^ A r t h u r J. Marinelli, Jr., "The Expanding Scope
of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties," Case
Western Reserve Law Review 23 (November, 1971):ll6.
in
R. James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July,
197*0 :1207.
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false representation on the part of the defendant and
justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.

Thus,

without actually proving the existence of pure fraud,
a third party plaintiff may provide evidence which
sustains a charge of gross negligence, and therefore,
may be used by a jury to infer fraud on the part of a
certified public accountant.
In order to prove that such a false, or grossly
negligent, misrepresentation has been made by the account
ant, the third party statement user needs only to show
that the public accountant had no factual basis upon
which to make his representation.

Since the opinion

of the accountant implies that he has made a firm factual
examination of the financial records of a particular
company, a substantially wrong representation which
indicates that the accountant has made no such factual
examination is sufficient to prove the gross negligence,
and possible fraud, of that certified public accountant.^2
As one recent court stated:
To be actionable deceit, the representation
need not be made with knowledge of actual falsity,
but need only be an ’assertion, as a fact, of that
which is not true, by one who has no reasonable
ground for believing it to be true . . .’43
Through the use of this gross negligence concept,
the courts developed two means by which a jury can
hp

American Law Institute, p. 65.
^ G a g n e v. Bertran, 275 P. 2d 15 (Calif. 1954).
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conclude that the activity of a public accountant was
fraudulent.

Unfortunately, this attempt on the part

of the judiciary to provide a more liberal approach to
the issue of fraudulent conduct has created a great
deal of confusion.

The existence of these two doctrines

of liability placement has only contributed to the sub
stantial amount of overlap which exists between the legal
concepts of pure fraud and simple negligence.^
Liability for Negligence— The Privity Concept
Almost all of the court jurisdictions in the
United States have accepted both the concept of pure
fraud and the idea of gross negligence as an inference
of fraud as viable forms of third party legal action.
Yet, the judiciary is a great deal less consistent in
its interpretation of the law of accountants' third
party liability when the accountant is guilty of nothing
more than simple negligence.

Although the courts have

commonly agreed that simple negligence on the part of
the accountant consists of a failure to perform a service,
or make a report, with the due care commonly exercised
by accountants and required by professional standards,^5
the courts have been quite inconsistent in their applica
tion of this concept.

This inconsistency results from

^Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.
873 (Tex. App. 1971).
^Qormley, p. 1206.
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the insertion of another factor into the issue of liability
placement.

Beyond determining whether the accountant

is actually guilty of negligence in the performance
of his services, the courts have also attempted to
determine whether the relationship existent between
the third party and the public accountant is sufficient
to require the accountant to exercise that duty of
due c a r e . T h i s

second requirement has resulted in the

proliferation of several doctrines of liability placement,
none of which

is

generally accepted by all courts.

In 1931, Justice Cardozo, rendering the decision
of the court in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven
and

Company

^7 (Ultramares), halted what he had termed

"the assault upon the citadel of privity".

Cardozo took

this step in an attempt to shield the accounting pro
fession from the potentially crushing burden of third
party liability for simple negligence.

It has been

this same prerequisite of privity of contract which has
successfully insulated the accountant from most third
iiQ
party legal action. 7
^ T h o m a s W. Hill, Jr. "The Public Accountants1
Legal Liability to Clients and Others," New York
Certified Public Accountant 38 (January, 1968):23.
^Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven and
Company, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 44l (1931).
lip

Prosser, p. 239-

^Reiling, p. 40.

While the attack upon the citadel of privity
did continue to move forward on some legal fronts, the
area of liability in which the public accountant is most
primarily involved (i.e., that of liability for the
pecuniary losses suffered by third parties) is heavily
protected.

By i960, the requirement of the existence

of a contractual relationship between parties had been
all but discarded by the courts in dealing with cases of
physical i n j u r y ; ^ yet, where the injury suffered by
the third party was pecuniary in nature, the courts
were not so willing to abandon privity of contract in
favor of third party r e c o v e r y . ^
Today, many courts automatically apply Cardozo’s
prerequisite of a relationship equivalent to privity of
contract when dealing with suits instituted by third
parties who have suffered pecuniary loss due to the
ordinary negligence of others .

^

Therefore, it would

seem that where the privity doctrine is followed, an
accountant will noi be held liable to a third party for
5°Prosser, p. 232.
^Ri c h a r d L. Miller, "Public Accountants and
Attorneys:
Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame
Lawyer 47 (Fall, 1972) :593.
5^See MacNerland v. Barnes, 199 S.E. 2d 564 (Ga.
App. 1973); and Stephens Industries, Incorporated v.
Haskins and Sells, 438 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); and
Investment Corporation of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d
291 (Fla. App. 1968); and Duro Sportswear, Incorporated
Cogen, 131 N.Y.S. 20 (1954); and Chandler v. Chrane,
Christmas and Company [1951] 2 K.B. 164.
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negligent misrepresentation.

While this doctrine

represents the state of the law in many court jurisdic
tions, there have been indications that the assault upon
CO

the citadel has not been completely abandoned.
Liability for Negligence— The
Primary Benefit Rule
While many American Courts were applying the
New York Rule of privity of contract to all situations
involving third parties and negligent public accountants,
other courts, both American and English, were taking a
second look at the all encompassing Ultramares Decision.
This second look at the decision rendered by Cardozo
in Ultramares produced some significant liberalizations
in the law of negligent misrepresentation.
When reinterpreting the Ultramares Decision,
several courts realized that the determination of whether
or not a defendant in a specific case should be held
liable to third parties not in privity of contract is
a matter of policy, and thus, involves the balancing of
many legal and social factors.
such things as:

These factors include

the extent to which the representation

was intended to influence the third party plaintiff,
the foreseeability of the harm which the third party
plaintiff suffered, the degree to which the injury suffered
by the third party plaintiff was certain and the closeness
^Nicholas D. Tellie, "Auditor's Liability to
Third Parties," Loyola Law Review 17 (1970-1971):357.
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of the connection between the defendant’s negligence and
the injury suffered by the third party

p l a i n t i f f . 5^

This careful balancing process has resulted in an expanded
doctrine of accountants’ third party liability which has
been termed the primary benefit rule.
While the primary benefit rule was actually first
espoused by the New York Court in Glanzer v. Shepard^5
(Glanzer), the rule itself remained relatively dormant
for almost fifty years.

Then, in several different

court decisions, both the American and English Judiciaries
began to reassert this doctrine of liability placement
as a means of circumventing Justice Cardozo's prerequisite
of privity of contract.

This process of circumvention

was to represent a serious move toward the final abandon
ment of privity as a requirement in cases involving
negligent misrepresentation.
The process of reasserting the primary benefit
rule began in the English Case of Hedley Bryne and Company
v. Heller and Partners-^ (Hedley Bryne).

It was in this

case that the English Court recognized the right of an
injured third party to recover pecuniary damages which
were caused by the negligent misrepresentation of another.
^ A l u m a Kraft Manufacturing Company v. Elmer Pox
and Company, 493 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973).
55Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275

(1922 ).
-^Hedley Bryne and Company v. Heller and Partners
[1964] 2 A .C . 465.

The court argued that this right of recovery should be
granted whenever a certain "special relationship" existed
between the parties.

While the English Court left the

exact limits of this special relationship undefined,
it would seem that the public accountant would often
find such a relationship existing between himself and
a third party financial statement

user.
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The American Courts were quick to apply the doctrine
of primary benefit to cases involving certified public
accountants and third party financial statement users.
The Rhode Island Court based its decision in Rusch
Factors v. Levin^S (Rusch Factors) on this early common
law doctrine.

In so doing, the Rusch Factors Court

held that accountants did owe a duty to exercise due
care to those third parties who are specifically foreseen,
and known, by the public accountant.

One year later,

the Iowa Court in the case of Ryan v. Kanne-^ (Ryan)
expressed this same sentiment by saying:
This being a case of first impression in Iowa,
we are disposed to reject the rule that third parties
not in privity of contract or in a fiduciary relation
ship are always barred from recovery for negligence
of the party issuing the instrument upon which the
third party relies, to his detriment.
It is unneces
sary at this time to determine whether the rule of
no liability should be relaxed to all foreseeable
^ L e o n a r d Mentzer, "Accountant's Common Law Liability
to Third Persons for Misrepresentation," California Law
Review 57 (1969):283.
5®Rusch Factors.
59Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
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persons who may rely upon the report, but we do
hold It should be relaxed to those who are actually
known to the author as prospective users of the
report . . .
Thus, it would seem, that certain jurisdictions
recognize an accountant to be legally responsible for
pecuniary losses suffered by third party financial state
ment users and caused by the negligent misrepresentation
of the public accountant.

Such liability shall be

recognized, even though there is an absence of privity
of contract, if the financial statement user is specifi
cally known to the negligent accountant.6l
Liability for Negligence— The
Foreseen Class Concept
Most of the jurisdictions which have accepted the
primary benefit rule as a means of liability placement
have also found that the rule has inherent in it a
severe limitation as to the number of individuals who
will be allowed a means of loss recovery.

In an attempt

to lessen this limiting factor, many of these liberal
courts have introduced the idea of the foreseen class
to the area of accountants' third party liability.^2
Under such a concept of liability placement, the account
ant would not only be held responsible to those individuals
6oIbid.
6lIbid.
62see Rhode Island; and Rusch Factors; and Shatter
proof Glass; and Ryan.

who are specifically foreseen, but would also be legally
responsible to all members of any class of individuals
which

is

specifically foreseen by the accountant.

In this way, the courts have expanded the number of third
parties that could recover pecuniary damages suffered
due to the negligent misrepresentation of the public
accountant.^3

Thus, if the public accountant knows

that his financial representation will be used by his
client for a specific purpose, and further, if the account
ant realizes that a specific class of persons will rely
upon his financial representation in fulfilling that
purpose, the accountant will be held liable for the
damages suffered by any member of that class due to their
reliance on his financial misrepresentation.

This concept

of liability placement provides a substantial expansion
of the accountant's third party responsibility, while
not yet embracing the indeterminate liability which was
\
once so feared.
Although many courts have disregarded privity of
contract, and thus, held professionals liable for the
pecuniary losses of third parties, accountants have not
been totally stripped of the protection which was once
provided them.

While some courts do render decisions,

and express dicta, contrary to Cardozo's New York Rule,
63»Torts:
Accountant Liable to Third Party for
Negligent Misrepresentation," Minnesota Law Review 53
(June, 1969 ):1383•
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no court has ever attempted to overrule the Ultramares
Decision.

More Importantly, there is no indication that

any court will attempt to do so in the near f u t ure.^
Rusch Factors provides an example of this combina
tion of judicial attitude and action.

While the Rusch

Factors Court disagreed with the reasoning used to arrive
at the New York Rule of privity, the Rusch Factors
Court made careful efforts to distinguish, and not
overrule, Ultramares.^5

in distinguishing the cases,

and thus, accepting the primary benefit rule, the Rusch
Factors Court said:
This Court need not, however, hold that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court would overrule the Ultramares
decision if presented with the opportunity, for the
case at bar is quantitatively distinguishable from
Ultramares.
It would seem that, depending upon the jurisdiction,
the primary benefit rule, the foreseen class concept or
the prerequisite of privity of contract will be applied
by the courts to determine the liability of negligent
accountants to third party financial statement users.
Liability for Negligence— The
Foreseeability Concept
The current, and more liberal, trend of legal
thought seems to run contrary to the idea of privity of
^Reiling.
^ T h o m a s F. Rogers, "Accounting— Is Liability for
Ordinary Negligence Just Around the Corner?," Boston
University Law Review 49 (Winter, 1969):194.
^ R u s c h Factors.

contract and the entire Ultramares Decision.

Perhaps

this judicial trend is due to a general breakdown in the
privity doctrine in other areas of the law; or, perhaps
this trend is due to a recognition of accounting as
a public service.

No matter what the reason, the decline

of the prerequisite of privity of contract has precipitated
a substantial expansion of the accountant's legal liability
to third party financial statement users .

^

One of the means by which the courts could implement
this expanded liability is through the acceptance of
reasonable foreseeability as the guide to liability place
ment.

Under such a doctrine of liability placement,

the negligent accountant would be legally responsible
to all of those third parties which he should have
reasonably expected to rely on his financial representa
tion.^

This concept of liability placement would

facilitate the most significant expansion of the account
ant's liability to third party statement users.
The concept of reasonable foreseeability, like
the primary benefit rule, is not new in origin.

In fact,

it was Justice Cardozo, expressing the decision of the
New York Court in Palsgraf v. Long Island

R a i l r o a d *^

(Palsgraf), who first mentioned the concept as a viable
^^Murphy, p. 387.
^Shatterproof Glass.
69palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339>
162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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means of liability placement.

As Cardozo said, "The

risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another
or others within the range of a p p r e h e n s i o n . It
would seem that Cardozo felt that the foreseeability of
the risk determined the extent of the relationship
between parties, and thus, the concomitant liability.
While no American Court has yet applied the standard
of reasonable foreseeability to the public accountantthird party relationship,71 other courts, in cases dealing
with members of other skilled professions, have sought
to embrace such a concept of liability placement.72
Yet, beyond this basic acceptance in other areas
of the law of negligence, there are two factors confronting
the public accounting profession which Indicate the
significance of the reasonable foreseeability concept.
First, the Securities Act of 1933 relies on the concept
of foreseeability in defining the limits of its civil
liability.

Section 11 of the act imposes liability upon

public accountants for negligence in the preparation
of a registration statement.

This liability extends to

70lbid.
71"Torts— Negligence— Accountant Held Liable to
a Third Party Not in Privity," The University of Kansas
Law Review 22 (Winter, 197^0:295.
7^See LIcata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 78, 225
A. 2d 28 (1966).
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all parties who purchase securities covered by that
registration statement.73

Thus, under this legislation,-

the accountant is liable to every member of this fore
seeable class.

Second, many courts have indicated a

favorable attitude toward the doctrine of foreseeability
when dealing with accountants' common law liability
to third parties.7^

it would therefore seem that the

courts of several jurisdictions will be willing to accept
a doctrine of reasonable foreseeability as a means of
liability placement if confronted with a particular
accountant-third party situation.
The statutory and common laws of accountants' third
party liability provide the courts with six concepts of
liability placement from which to choose.

While the selec

tion of a particular doctrine is the result of a careful
balancing process, the courts have indicated a judicial
attitude toward expansion of the accountant's third party
liability.

This attitude toward expansion, when combined

with the variety of legal doctrines, confronts the public
accountant with a most confusing legal situation.
Summary
The liability of public accountants to third
party financial statement users represents a most
73Securitles Act of 1933, U.S. Code, Title 15,
sec. 77(k) (1970).
7**See Shatterproof Glass; and Ryan.

perplexing area of the law.

The perplexing nature of

this area is the result of a combination of two factors.
First, the judiciary has introduced an element of uncer
tainty into this area of the law by establishing legal
principles of professional responsibility which differ
substantially from the standards which the accounting
profession has established to regulate the activities
of its members.

This gap between professional and legal

standards has often stultified the profession in its
attempts to keep pace with the economic needs of society.
Second, the judiciary has introduced an element of uncer
tainty into this area of the law by establishing six
different doctrines of liability placement which can be
applied to the accountant-third party relationship.

These

doctrines have made it virtually impossible for the public
accountant to determine the scope of his third party
liability.

In general, it would seem that the public

accounting and legal professions are today faced with
the problem of developing a workable doctrine of account
ants third party liability.

Chapters four and five attempt

to explore, and eventually provide a solution to, this
problem.

CHAPTER IV
THE CASE FOR EXTENDED ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
Today, a careful balancing process is inherent
in the determination of the public accountant’s civil
liability to third party financial statement users (see
chapter three).

This careful balancing not only involves

a search for legal doctrines which will introduce equity
and certainty into the law, but also, involves a search
for a full understanding of the potential nonlegal impact
of each of those doctrines of law.
This chapter undertakes an analysis of the recent
liberal trends inherent in this judicial balancing
process.

To facilitate the accomplishment of this task,

a two step approach is used.

First, a discussion of

the most often used justifications for extended account
ants' liability Is presented.

This discussion Is struc

tured to reveal both the legal and extra-legal signifi
cance of each argument.

Second, a discussion of the

major effects of such a liability extension is presented.
This discussion is structured to reveal the impact which
such a liability extension would have on society and
the accounting profession.

Such a two step approach

provides a sound basis upon which a unified concept
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of the public accountants' third party legal liability
may be built.
Justifications for Extended Liability
In 1931, Justice Cardozo could find no significant
reason to impose upon negligent public accountants lia
bility for the injuries suffered by third party financial
statement users.

Since Cardozo first espoused this

lack of justification, however, the courts have generally
followed a path which has continually led to greater
third party liability for the public accounting profession.
These more liberal courts have usually relied upon three
justifications for their movement toward the imposition
of a greater degree of liability.

First, the courts

have agreed that public accounting is a "skilled profes
sion".

Therefore, some authorities argue that accountants

should assume a degree of legal responsibility concomi
tant to this professional status.

Second, the courts

have reasoned that third parties are forced to rely
upon the public accountants' examination as their major
verification of financial information.

Therefore, many

authorities have argued that the public accountant owes
a duty of due care to the third party statement user.
Finally, the courts have reasoned that the pursuit of
legal -equity would require the judiciary to extend a
helping hand to the innocent, but injured, third party.
Therefore, legal authorities have argued that the
public accountant, and not the third party, should bear

the burden of the accountant’s misrepresentation.

A

further analysis of each of these justifications follows.
Accounting as a Skilled Profession
Members of the accounting profession have always
sought to convey to the public an image equivalent to
that of the skilled professions of medicine and law.-*While for many years, the profession was burdened with
the public image of the green visored bookkeeper, today
the extensive reliance placed on the financial state
ments and opinion prepared by the certified public account
ant has elevated accounting to that desired position of
professional status.

0

The independent auditor is now

viewed by society as an expert at his calling, an indi
vidual who possesses skills above and beyond those of
the ordinary man. 3
This professional status to which the public
accountant has been elevated has brought with it three
significant advantages.

First, this rise to professional

status has precipitated a significant increase in the
fees received by public accountants.

Second, this rise

•^Victor M. Earle, "The Litigation Explosion,"
Journal of Accountancy 129 (March, 1970):65.
^Richard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and
Attorneys:
Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame
Lawyer 47 (Fall, 1972):605.3joseph P. Dawson, "Auditors’ Third Party Liability
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law," Washington Law
Review 46 (1971)s679.
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to professional status has produced a concomitant rise
in the prestige afforded public accountants by various
segments of our society.**

Finally, this rise to profes

sional status has, for the most part, produced signifi
cant legal advantages for public accountants.-5 These
three specific advantages have had a tremendous impact
upon both the public accounting profession and its
members.
For the members of most professions, the advantages
which are gained due to an increase in status are accom
panied by an increase in certain of the profession's
legal responsibilities.

Professional men, in general,

and all others who undertake a type of work which calls
for the use of special skills, are required by the courts
not only to exercise reasonable care in the performance
of their service function, but also, are required to
possess a minimum level of special skill and ability.^
If such a professional person professes to speak with
knowledge on a particular subject about which he should
know, or a subject about which he has a duty to know,
that skilled professional should be held responsible
for any damages suffered due to his failure to apply
^Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466
S.W. 873 (Tex. App. 1971).
Paul:

^William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (St.
West Publishing Company), p. 165.
^Ibid., p. 161.
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reasonable care In the making of his representation
of that knowledge to others.7

if this professional

duty of due care were universally applied by the courts,
it would seem that such a duty would apply to the account
ant-third party relationship.

Yet, the courts have

never attempted such a universal application.
Since the promulgation of the New York Rule, two
forces have had a significant impact on the area of the
professional’s legal liability to third parties.

First,

the legal liability of negligent professionals for the
pecuniary losses of third parties has, in general,:
increased steadily. ^

This increasing trend is due to

the courts' acceptance of more liberal concepts of lia
bility placement in most areas of the law of negligence.
Second, the legal liability of public accountants to
third party financial statement users has failed to
keep pace with the other areas of professional negligence
liability.

This trend is due to the unwillingness of

many courts to abandon the concept of privity of contract
when dealing with the accountant-third party relationship.
Thus, while the public accounting profession is eager
to reap the benefits associated with professional status,
7e . S. Oakes, and G. S. Gullick, eds., American
Jurisprudence (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Company,
19^0), vol. 23, sec. 127.
^Darrell D. Halleth and Thomas R. Collins,
"Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation:
Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements,"
Washington Law Review 44 (1968):191.
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public accountants have not been forced to assume an
equivalent amount of legal responsibility.9
If the public accounting profession is to maintain
its public image, individual accountants must be willing
to accept the responsibilities inherent in that image.
The certified public accountant should become a profes
sional reporter.10

Therefore, he should accept, at

least to some degree, liability to third parties for
failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance
of his public attest function.
The Third Party's Forced Reliance
As far back as the thirties, there existed an
extremely close relationship between the public account
ant and the third party financial statement user.
Although this accountant-third party relationship was
an extremely close one, it was generally agreed upon that
the services of public accountants were primarily for
the benefit of client corporations.

Justice Cardozo

had expressed the judiciary's agreement with this sentiment
as early as 1931 (see chapter two).

Today, the relation

ship existent between the third party and the public
9r . W. V. Dickerson, "Accountants and the Law
of Negligence," Financial Executive 31* (November, 1966):
8.
1^John C. Burton, "An Educator Views the Public
Accounting Profession," Journal of Accountancy 132
(September, 1971) :50.
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accountant has grown even closer.11

No longer does

the certified public accountant primarily serve his
employer.

Instead, the primary goal of the public account

ant’s function is to provide an opinion as to the fairness
with which a particular financial representation could
be used by outsiders.

In fact, the accountant-third

party relationship has become so primary that if not
for the demands of third party statement users, most
publicly held corporations would not find the services of
independent public accountants at all necessary.1^
This increase in the primacy of the accountantthird party relationship is directly related to an
increase in the reliance placed on certified financial
statements by third parties.

There are four major reasons

for this increase in the third party’s reliance on
independently verified financial statements.

First,

third parties generally lack the expertise necessary for
proper analysis of a particular entity's financial
position.

Second, third parties generally lack access

to the information necessary for a complete financial
analysis of any corporate entity.

Third, both the third

party and the corporate entity would soon find the cost
of individual financial examinations to be highly
11Nicholas D. Tellie, "Auditor's Liability to
Third Parties," Loyola Law Review 17 (1970-1971):357.
12Norman 0. Olson, "The Auditor in Legal Difficulty—
What’s the Answer?," Journal of Accountancy 129 (April,
1970):43.
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prohibitive.

Fourth, individual financial examinations

would eventually place an unwarranted burden upon the
record keeping operations of any particular business
e n t i t y . T h e s e four factors, when combined with the
fact that the third party is seldom capable of choosing
the public accountant upon whom he will rely,11* force
the third party statement user to place blind faith in
the opinion of any member of the public accounting pro
fession.
This increased third party reliance has forced
the accounting profession to operate in a more public
sphere.

This public sphere is governed by the laws of

free competition, and as such, attempts to provide each
entity with complete information in order to guarantee
efficient and accurate allocations of scarce resources.
Any misstated financial information will result in resource
misallocation and w a s t e . ^

Since the public is not

expert at this process of information procurement and
dissemination— and the certified public accountant is—
the public is at the mercy of the professional accountant.
Therefore, the old rules of law based upon the more or
13M ^ r t s — Professional Negligence— Accountants
may be Liable to Third Parties for Negligence,” Texas
Law Review 50 (January, 1972):4l6-4l7.

■^Denzil y. Causey, Jr., "Foreseeability as a
Determinant of Audit Responsibility,” The Accounting Review
47 (April, 1973):26l.
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less private relationship between the auditor and his
employer must be abandoned.^

The trend toward the

public watchdog function of accounting must continue.^
It would seem to be in the public interest for the
courts to take a serious look at a possible extension of
the accountant's public responsibilities.1®
The Lack of Legal Equity
In 1931, the New York Court used what might be
called some "novel" theories of tort liability place
ment to protect the public accountant from a potentially
ruinous third party legal liability.

The result of the

imposition of these novel theories of liability place
ment was that in choosing between the injured third
party statement user and the negligent accountant, the
court concluded that the innocent third party should be
forced to bear the burden of the pecuniary damages
suffered due to the public accountant's financial mis
representation (for justification see chapter two).1^
Prior to the establishment of this rule of tort
liability placement, the courts had generally recognized
l6Tellie, p. 357^ T h o m a s W. Hill, Jr., "The Public Accountants'
Legal Liability to Clients and Others," New York Certified
Public Accountant 38 (January, 1968):28..
■^Olson, p. 39.
•^Texas Tunneling Company v. City of Chattanooga,
204 P. Supp 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), rev'd 329 F. 2d 402
(6th Cir. 1964).
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that legal equity made it necessary to place the burden
of any damages suffered due to the negligent manufacture
of an Inherently dangerous object upon the maker of that
particular object.2^

While this concept of negligence

liability has been almost totally accepted by the courts
when dealing with cases which involve negligence resulting
in personal injury, the judiciary has not found this
concept to be universally desirable when dealing with
cases which involve public accountants, third party
statement users and pecuniary damages.
This dichotomy in legal reasoning leaves a basic
question unanswered.

Is a negligently audited set of

financial statements any less dangerous to a potential
user than a negligently manufactured automobile?

The

first of these acts causes the potential loss of an
individual’s financial resources, the second potentially
causes the loss of the individual's ability to generate
those resources.21

In a complex industrial society,

the public accountant’s opinion as to the fairness of
a particular financial representation can inflict upon
a statement user damage more potent than any injury
which can be inflicted by a particular manufacturer's
tools.^2

While the lack of any distinction between the

^°MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382

(1916 ).
21Miller, p. 605..
^ U n i t e d States v. Benjamin, 328 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir.
1964).
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consequences of these acts seems quite apparent, the
courts have, for some reason, found a discernable distinc
tion existent.

This difference, and its repeated judicial

application, have produced a significant impairment of
the legal equity inherent to the system.
An extension of the third party civil liability
of certified public accountants would enhance the equitable
nature of the judicial system in three ways.

First, by

forcing the members of the public accounting profession
to assume the financial burden created by their mistakes—
a financial burden which would almost certainly be passed
on to the general consuming public in the form of higher
audit prices— the legal system would provide for an
equitable distribution of that financial burden over the
whole of society instead of causing the manifestation
of the injury to be limited to one particular financial
statement user.23

Second, by forcing the members of the

public accounting profession to assume the financial
burden created by their mistakes, the legal system would
shift the impact of the financial loss from the party
who only relies upon the financial misrepresentation to
the party who actually created that misrepresentation.

oh

Third, by forcing the members of the public accounting
profession to assume the financial burden created by their
23Rusch Factors, Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F. Supp.
85 (R.I. 1968).
2^Earle, p.

67.

104
mistakes, the legal system would create a great deal of
judicial balance between tort liability for personal,
property and pecuniary damage. 25

Thus, it would seem

that an increase in the public accountant's civil lia
bility to thrid party financial statement users would
enhance the equity inherent in the existent system of
law.
Legal authorities, and many courts, have reasoned
that a certified public accountant should, at least to
some extent, be responsible to third party financial
statement users for misrepresentations which cause
pecuniary loss.

The fact that public accountants are

members of a skilled profession, the fact that the general
public is provided with no alternative other than to rely
on the representations of members of that profession,
and the fact that the current legal system fails to
achieve a state of equity, all contribute to the case for
extending the accountant's civil liability.

Yet, any law

of accountants' liability must, by necessity, result from
the application of a careful balancing process.

The

remainder of this chapter discusses the factors inherent
in the other half of that process.
Effects of Extended Liability
The second half of that judicial balancing process
consists of weighing the effects that an extension of the
2^Mlller, p. 605.

accountant’s civil liability would have upon the public
accounting profession, and potentially, the rest of
economic society.

In general, it has been argued that

there would be three major effects caused by an extension
of the legal responsibilities of members of the public
accounting profession.

First, an increase in the legal

responsibilities of public accountants might foster the
development of better accounting principles, procedures and
practices.

Second, an increase in the legal responsi

bilities of public accountants might seriously affect
the cost and availability of malpractice insurance.
Finally, an increase in the legal responsibilities of
public accountants might create a serious economic
threat to the entire accounting profession.

The remainder

of this chapter seeks to analyze each of these potential
effects.
The Effect on Accounting Services
Contrary to the arguments which have been advanced
by several writers, a liberalization of the legal concepts
which presently govern the accountant-third party rela
tionship would not necessarily leave the certified public
accountant without adequate protection from third party
litigation.

Even if all courts were to universally

accept such an extension of the public accountant’s
legal responsibilities, the Individual accountant could
be held responsible to third party statement users only
for pure fraud, failure to act in good faith or a failure
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to exercise due care in the performance of the attest
function.

In other words, the accountant must, at least

to some extent, be guilty of some degree of fault if
third party liability is to be imposed by the judiciary.
It would seem that the proficient public account
ant (i.e., the public accountant who applies the standards
which have been established by the profession in a careful
and accurate manner) would be able to rely upon the
principles and procedures of the accounting profession
as a prime mechanism for avoiding an expanded third
party legal liability.

Yet, it would further seem, that

the threat of this potential legal liability would
constitute a positive force for professional action.
This threat of third party litigation would provide an
incentive for the profession, and its members, to take
action to insure the avoidance of such liability.
These positive professional actions would take
several forms.

First, the potential for increased

liability would force the public accountant, and the
profession in general, to take steps to improve the
results of the audit process.

An increase in the scope of

many audits, an increase in the independent auditor's
personal adherence to generally accepted auditing standards
and an increase in the general level of those standards
p

R. James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July,
1974):1206.

would probably be an Inherent part of the process of
upgrading the auditor's attest function.2?

Second,

a potentially greater legal responsibility to third
parties would force the accountant to become more aware
of the existence of the primary user of his financial
representations— the third party.

No longer would

the public accountant be able to satisfy his legal
responsibilities by providing information adequate to
meet his client's needs.

Instead, the certified public

accountant will have to supplant this old client
orientation with a new form of user orientation.28
Third, an increase in the legal responsibilities of public
accountants would tend to push substandard accountants
away from certain engagements.

Engagements which

involve potentially great amounts of liability would
be handled by those accountants most able to deal with
the specific problems which might arise.

Finally,

the acceptance of a legal doctrine which would hold
the accountant liable to a greater extent would defi
nitely lead to an increase in the use of cautionary
devices.

All members of the profession would approach

each engagement with a great deal more care and caution.2^
27"Torts— Professional Negligence . . .," pp. 4l6417.
28MIller, p. 609.
2^Rusch Factors.
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Thus, an upgrading of professional services seems to
represent at least one major advantage of an extension
of the public accountant’s third party responsibility.
The Effect on Malpractice Insurance
Although it is highly probable that an extension
of the public accountant’s legal liability will produce
certain beneficial effects, most recent writers have
concentrated on the fact that such an extension of
legal responsibility will create certain major dis
advantages for both the accounting profession and economic
society.

One of these major disadvantages lies in the

effect that increased legal liability would have upon
the institution of accountants’ malpractice insurance.
As the potential for legal liability for injury
suffered by third party financial statement users has
become an integral part of the accountant's audit function,
more and more members of the profession have turned to
malpractice insurance as a means of obtaining protection
from judgments arising out of third party litigation.
Yet, most accountants, and many insurance underwriters,
have expressed the opinion that an increase in the third
party responsibility of the public accounting profession
would both create upward pressure on the price of such
insurance protection, and force underwriters to limit
the number of firms to which such protection could be
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offered. 30

For these reasons, accountants fear that

adequate Insurance will not be available to protect
them from the economic effects which would result from
an increase in third party liability.
While the cost of adequate malpractice insurance
coverage would almost certainly rise as the courts extend
the legal responsibilities of the public accounting
profession, the prudent public accountant would be capable
of taking appropriate steps to prevent this sudden
increase in insurance cost from seriously damaging his
practice.

One available mechanism for dealing with the

problem of increased insurance premiums is that of
including a deductible provision in the policy.

As

early as 1970, insurance companies were offering this
type of policy to members of the accounting profession.
One such policy was then based on a sliding scale which
presented accountants with the opportunity to gain any
where from a seven percent reduction in the premium for
assuming a $250 deductible to a thirty percent reduction
for assuming a $10,000 deductible.31

Thus, by acting

as a self-insurer for a portion of any legal liability,
3°See Constantine N. Katsoris, "Measures to Reduce
Accountants' Public Liability Exposure," New York Certified
Public Accountant 40 (January, 1970):36; and Miller, p.

Sot;

3!Arthur J. Francia and Norman J. Elliot, "Signi
ficant Differences in Accountants' Professional Liability
Coverage," New York Certified Public Accountant 40
(October, 1970):6ll.
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the accountant can significantly reduce the burden of
the Increased Insurance costs which would result from
extended third party civil liability.
Beyond affecting the cost of malpractice insurance,
an extension of the public accountant’s legal responsi
bilities would also significantly affect the availability
of that insurance.

In fact, there is a great deal of

justifiable doubt as to whether the private sector could
continue any such policies in the face of such a liability
extension.

With no experience under the legal conditions

which would be prevalent, the private insurance under
writers would find it impossible to immediately determine
a sound rate structure.32

Therefore, most companies would,

at least temporarily, withdraw their policies from the
market.

Yet, again, if the profession reacts to this

problem in a prudent and rational manner, the situation
will not have a serious impact upon the practice of
public accounting.

As a primary action, the profession

could develop its own malpractice coverage to reduce
the negative economic effect of increased liability.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
and some state societies have already taken this type of
action.

Such action is designed to guarantee members

32Leonard Mentzer, "Accountants' Common Law
Liability to Third Persons for Misrepresentation,"
California Law Review 57 (1969):287.

Ill
some type of malpractice insurance coverage. 33

if

this type of professional action is capable of providing
individual accountants with a basic amount of temporary
protection, private sector insurance companies will
soon fill any gap which might remain.

As the new legal

doctrines become more clear, claim patterns will tend
to stabilize and private insurers will again be in a
position to offer the accountant adequate malpractice
insurance.3^.

Thus, in the long run, adequate insurance

coverage will always be available to members of the public
accounting profession. 35
Although problems in the areas of cost and avail
ability of malpractice insurance coverage represent
significant drawbacks to any extension of the public
accountant’s legal liability, proper action on the part
of the profession could mitigate the effects of such
problems.

Thus, it would seem that the balancing

process still weighs in favor of an increase in the
third party civil liability of the public accounting
profession.
33Richard S.. Helstein, "Guidelines for Professional
Liability Insurance Coverage," Certified Public Accountant
Journal 42 (October, 1 9 7 3 ) : 8 4 9 .
3^Mentzer.
35Miller, p. 606..
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The Economic Effect on Public Accounting
While many members of the public accounting pro
fession do fear the effect that increased legal respon
sibility will have upon the institution of malpractice
insurance, the profession’s greatest fear takes the form
of the indeterminate economic liability which Cardozo
had sought to avoid more than forty years ago.

Today,

accountants have reiterated Cardozo's economic fear in
a variety of forms.

First, the accounting profession

has continually argued that a liberalization of the
concepts presently governing the accountant-third party
relationship will create a tremendous economic burden
in the form of court imposed settlements.36

Second,

certain members of the accounting profession have argued
that increased legal responsibilities will eventually
force smaller public accounting firms to redirect their
efforts away from areas of potentially large liability
settlements.

This redirection of efforts, it is argued,

will eventually result in a shortage of certain types
of accounting

services.

37

Third, most public accounting

firms have argued that an increase in legal responsibility
will eventually produce an increase in the cost, and thus
the price, of audit services.3®

Although each of these

3^Thomas F. Rogers, "Accounting— Is Liability for
Ordinary Negligence Just Around the Corner?," Boston
University Law Review 49 (Winter, 1969):196.
37oawson, p. 699
38Ibid., p. 701.
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lines of argumentation has some basic degree of merit,
a further examination will reveal that the relative
significance of each is somewhat questionable.
The primary fear of most public accountants, and
the factor which motivated Cardozo, is that the imposi
tion of extended legal responsibility will eventually
result in the financial ruin of the entire profession
of public accounting.

While the factors inherent in

the realization of this fear may have been significant
enough to warrant a liability limiting decision in 1931>
the economic circumstances which surround the activities
of public accountants today give rise to questions as
to the present validity of that decision.

In the early

thirties, it was estimated that the gross income of all
individuals and firms involved in the practice of public
accounting was $60 million.39

At that same time, the

average market value of the stock issued by a New York
Stock Exchange Company (a measure of the maximum potential
third party liability of public accountants) was below
$59 million.1*0

Yet, by the early seventies, these

relationships had changed significantly.

While the

average market value of a New York Stock Exchange
Corporation's stock had risen to a level slightly less

^"Certified

Public Accountants," Fortune 5

(June, 1932):95**°See Thomas T. Murphy , ed., The New. York Stock
Exchange ‘197*1 Fact Book (New York: New York Stock
Exchange, 197*0 •

than ten times that existent in 1930, ^

the gross

income of persons and firms involved in public accounting
rose to a level at least fifty times as great as that in
the earlier period.

In 197^> one public accounting firm,

Arthur Andersen and Company, reported gross income of
more than $200 m i l l i o n . I t

would therefore seem that

the potential of the public accounting profession to
withstand the economic effects of extended liability
has increased substantially over the last forty years.
Yet, even beyond this basic change in the economic
situation, there has been a second occurrence which
today protects members of the accounting profession from
the financial ruin which might result from third party
litigation.

Today, unlike the period of the thirties,

most accounting firms carry some form of professional
malpractice insurance.

This insurance coverage provides

accountants with at least partial compensation for any
losses which are incurred due to court imposed legal
settlements.

Thus, the economic growth of the profession

and the development of professional malpractice insurance
coverage serve to reduce the chances of court imposed
financial disaster for the public accountant.
As the public accountant's legal liability to
third party financial statement users increases, some
^1Ibid.
^2See Arthur Andersen and Company, Annual Report of
Arthur Andersen and Company (Chicago: Arthur Andersen
and Company, 197^)*
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of the smaller members of the industry may find it desirable
to reorient their service functions away from areas of
potentially high third party involvement.

Certain

members of the profession have recently argued that
this redirection of efforts on the part of small firms may
create a shortage of available audit services for publicly
held corporations.^3

Yet, a further analysis, again,

reveals the lack of significance of this line of argumenta
tion.

At present the "big eight" accounting firms handle

approximately eighty percent of all audits conducted on
publicly held clients.^

Surely, an increase in the

efforts of these major firms, combined with the general
efforts of the large regional firms, would guarantee
the existence of adequate services to meet the needs of
both new and old publicly held corporations.
Since an extension of the public accountant's
third party legal responsibilities would create a need
to increase the scope of some audit examinations, cause
the profession to incorporate an increased number of
cautionary techniques into the audit function and place
increased upward pressure on the cost of professional
^ S i n c e publicly held corporations represent the
area of greatest relationship between the public account
ant and the third party financial statement user, members
of the profession fear that many of the smaller account
ing firms will avoid such a great amount of contact with
potential third party litigants by avoiding engagements
which involve these publicly held corporations.
**^Arthur M. Louis, "The Accountants are Changing
the Rules," Fortune 77 (June 15, 1968):178.

malpractice insurance coverage, members of the profession
would soon feel the need to increase the price of an
audit examination.

Accountants have recently argued

that such an increase in audit costs would first, force
smaller clients to abandon the use of independent financial
verifications, and second, cuase many small accounting
firms to lose their ability to compete for the available
client market.

Yet, again, there are several factors

which significantly reduce the weight of these arguments.
First, a combination of Securities and Exchange Commission
Requirements and the need for certified financial state
ments as a prerequisite to the consummation of many
types of business transactions would force most business
entities to maintain their present policy toward the
engagement of public accountants for audit purposes.
Second, since increased liability will potentially affect
all firms equally, no particular accounting firm should
be able to gain a competitive edge in terms of prices
without incurring a reduction in profits, or an increase
in financial risks.

Thus, it would seem that while an

increase in audit costs would be most certainly passed
on to clients, these increased costs would not have a
significant effect on the public accounting profession
or its members.
While larger court imposed settlements, a redirection
of the efforts of some smaller accounting firms and an
increase in audit service costs would result from increased
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legal liability, the profession can, and most probably
would, take action to negate the disadvantageous nature
of these economic effects.

Since these economic effects,

and the effects on the institution of malpractice insurance,
can be significantly reduced, and since an increase in
legal liability would produce better accounting practices,
it would seem that the balancing process weighs, at least
in terms of professional and societal effects, in favor
of an increase in the public accountant's legal respon
sibilities to third party financial statement users.
Summary
After performing the balancing process which is
applied to the area of accountants' liability, two
conclusions may be drawn.

First, there are significant

legal reasons for extending the accountant's third party
responsibilities beyond their present limits.

Second,

while there were, in 1930, significant extra-legal
reasons for not obeying the dictates of legal precedent,
these same extra-legal reasons do not exist, or can be
significantly militated, today.

Therefore, public

accountants should be held responsible to third party
financial statement users.

Chapter five attempts to

present a unified legal doctrine which could be used by
the courts to apply the results of this legal balancing
process.

CHAPTER V
A PROPOSED CONCEPT OP ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
With the basic process of balancing justifica
tions and effects completed, it becomes possible to
progress beyond the underlying analysis of situations
and reasoning, to the development of a basic set of
legal principles which can be applied by the courts as
a means of regulating the relationship which exists
between the public accountant and the third party
financial statement user.

At this point, two generaliza

tions concerning such a legal concept may be advanced.
First, any such set of judicial doctrines must be designed
in a manner which will provide the third party statement
user with at least a minimum degree of legal recourse
to members of the public accounting profession.

Unless

provided with such a means of recovery, the third party
will continue to bear the financial burden of the
certified public accountant's mistakes.

Second, any

such set of judicial doctrines must be based upon a
legal concept which can be consistently and equitably
applied by the courts, while also being easily understood
by members of both the public accounting profession and
118
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the general investing public.1

Without this degree of

consistency and predictability the courts, third parties
and the public accounting profession would soon find
a legal situation similar to the confusing state of the
law which confronts them today.
This chapter attempts to formulate a workable
legal concept through the use of a two step approach.
The first section of this chapter presents a proposed
concept which could be used to determine the professional
responsibilities of certified public accountants.

This

section centers on selecting a method of responsibility
determination which could eventually bring the legal
and professional interpretations of the accountant’s
audit responsibilities into greater harmony.

The second

section of this chapter attempts to delineate a doctrine
of liability placement which could be used in all instances
of accountant-third party litigation.

This section

concentrates on defining the relationship and degree of
fault which should be considered necessary to justify
third party recovery.

Such a two step approach provides

the basis of a solution to the perplexing problems
which currently surround the accountant-third party
legal relationship.
■^Henry B. Reiling and Russel A. Taussig, "Recent
Liability Cases— Implications for Accountants," Journal
of Accountancy 130 (September, 1970):47.
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The Determination of Professional
Responsibility
It was initially decided by the judiciary that
there was no justification for the imposition of court
espoused, uneducated, standards of conduct upon members
of the recognized "skilled professions".

In an effort

to Implement such a philosophy of responsibility determina
tion, the courts, in general, sought to allow members
of those professions, and their authorized regulatory
agencies, to promulgate the rules of professional conduct
which would be adhered to by persons practicing those
particular skills.

This degree of conformity between

the judicial and professional interpretations of the
standards of professional conduct contributed greatly
to the continued growth and prosperity of the public
accounting profession.
Unfortunately for the public accounting profession,
several recent courts have seen fit to circumvent this
generally accepted rule of legal conduct, and in so doing,
have imposed upon certain public accountants legal respon
sibilities above and beyond those which had been previously
established by the profession.

While these clashes

between the standards established by the courts and those
established by public accounting have, so far, been
limited to the areas of disclosure of subsequent event,
detection of the existence of fraudulent activity,
preparation of unaudited financial statements and dis
closure of current value financial information, most
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authorities have expressed the belief that any further
infringement by the courts upon the standards of public
accounting will further contribute to an attitude of
overconservatism which is currently embraced by many
members of the profession.

This attitude of overconserva

tism can seriously stultify the accounting profession
in its attempts to keep pace with the information needs
of economic society (see chapter three).
A specific concept of professional responsibility
determination must be developed in order to close the
gap which presently plagues the judiciary, third parties
and public accountants.

Such a legal concept must

necessarily include three basic parts.

First, such a

concept of professional responsibility determination
must provide for a uniform method of developing the legal
and professional standards by which a public accountant
will be judged.

Second, such a legal concept must

include a method by which the specific activities of
an Individual accountant may be compared with the standards
established for the profession as a whole.

Finally, such

a concept of responsibility determination must include
a clear statement of the limited conditions under which
it would be acceptable for a public accountant’s actions
to fall short of the generally accepted legal and pro
fessional standards.

A discussion of some proposed

ideas for each of these basic concepts of accountants'
third party liability follows.

Although the members of the public accounting
profession were initially free to establish the standards
which would be used to judge the reasonableness of an
individual accountant's audit activities, the courts
have recently begun to create inroads into this once
basic right of all skilled professionals.

Yet, if public

accounting is to continue to adequately serve the Investing
public, the courts must discontinue this policy of
judicial infringement.

The conduct of professional

accountants must be regulated by, and judged in accordance
with, standards which have been researched and developed
by knowledgeable groups of individuals.

While It is

proper for the courts to espouse broad guidelines and
possible goals for the accounting profession, the process
of promulgating specific accounting standards must be
left to the persons most capable of developing those
specific standards— public accountants.2

Unless the

courts again grant to the accounting profession the right
which has been universally extended to all other skilled
professionals— the right to develop their own standards
of professional conduct and responsibility— the accounting
profession, and therefore, all of economic society,
will continue to be burdened with professional standards
2Michael J. Whaling, "Liability of Certified Public
Accountants— Unaudited Financial Statements-— Certified
Public Accountants are Liable for Negligence in Preparation
of Unaudited Statements," Notre Dame Lawyer 48 (December,
1972):498-499.
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which have been promulgated by members of the judiciary
who are uneducated in the intricacies of accounting
practice.
Yet, the fact that public accountants should be
allowed to establish the standards of professional
conduct by which they will ultimately be judged does
not mean that each individual accountant should be
totally free to establish standards of professional con
duct for each particular audit examination.

If any

thing, the public accountant should be barred from using
professional standards as a means of avoiding liability.
The certified public accountant, above all, should
be precluded from using general compliance with a
set of isolated professional standards as a means of
universally avoiding liability.3

Instead, the activities

of members of the public accounting profession must be
judged in relation to the entire set of standards of
professional conduct and the way those standards relate
to the particular audit situation.

To accomplish this

task, the courts must continue to use the concept of
the "reasonably prudent man" as a basis for comparing
the activities of the individual accountant to those
which would be required by the profession’s standards
of conduct.

This reasonably prudent public accountant

3Theodore Sonde, "The Responsibility of Professionals
Under the Federal Securities Laws— Some Observations,"
Northwestern University Law Review 68 (March-April,
1973M.
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possesses the professional skills of the normal practicing
accountant.

Yet, unlike the normal practicing accountant,

the reasonably prudent accountant never is guilty of
performing an unreasonable act.

This accountant, in

theory, reacts to all fact situations in a reasonable
and prudent manner, and therefore, performs his audit
function in a manner which has been determined by his
profession, and economic society, to be acceptable.^
If the courts continue to apply the concept of the reason
able man to eases involving accountants and third party
financial statement users, economic society can be sure
that accounting standards will serve as guides to accept
able professional conduct, and not arbitrary rules for
the avoidance of civil liability.
If the courts were willing to allow the public
accounting profession to establish its own standards
of conduct, and if the courts were to continue to use
the concept of the reasonable man in determining whether
an individual public accountant had performed his audit
in accordance with those professional standards, the
problem of closing the gap between the professional and
legal interpretations of the accountant’s responsibilities
would be reduced significantly, but not yet completely
solved.

There would still exist certain situations in

which an individual public accountant would find it

Paul:

^William L. Prosser, Lavr of Torts, 4th ed. (St.
West Publishing Company, 1 971)» P • 151.
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impossible to comply with the profession’s established
standards of conduct.

Traditionally, such a situation

has caused the public accountant to add a disclaimer,
or qualification, to his audit opinion.

While this

method of informing the statement using public of the
accountant’s inability to conduct an adequate audit did
initially fulfill its purpose, some accountants have,
and most probably will, use one of these two mechanisms
as a means of avoiding their inherent legal responsi
bilities. 5

The courts must take two steps to preclude

the accountant from relying upon disclaimers and qualifica
tions as a mode of liability avoidance.

First, the courts

should refuse to recognize the validity of any overly
broad disclaimers or qualifications of opinions. ^

By

taking this first step, the courts would bar members
of the accounting profession from using general disclaimers
or qualifications as a means of precluding third party
litigation.

Second, the courts should require the public

accountant to state the specific reasons for any valid
disclaimer or qualification which is issued.

Such a

step would provide for third party financial statement
users information regarding the circumstances which
^See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969);
and Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz,
Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 F. 2d 847 (4th Cir.
1972).
^"Torts— Professional Negligence— Accountants may
be Liable to Third Parties for Negligence," Texas Law
Review 50 (January, 1972):417.
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resulted In the accountant’s inability to conduct an
adequate audit examination.

These two mechanisms would

allow the public accountant a means of avoiding liability
in certain uncontrollable situations, provide the third
party with information concerning the specifics of these
situations and prevent the public accountant from using
the disclaimer or qualification as a universal means of
liability avoidance.
It would therefore seem that three steps are
necessary if the gap between the professional and legal
interpretations of the public accountant’s responsibilities
Is to be narrowed.

Firsts the courts should again allow

knowledgeable members of the accounting profession
to establish the standards of conduct by which individual
public accountants must abide.

Second, the courts

must continue to use the concept of the reasonable man
in comparing the activities undertaken by an individual
accountant to those activities required by professional
standards and the individual fact situation.

Finally,

the courts must reject overly broad disclaimers and
qualifications of the professional accountant’s opinion.
This three step approach to responsibility determination
should have a significant, and advantageous, effect on
the legal situation which currently plagues the accounting
profession, the courts and third party financial state
ment users.
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The Placement of Civil Liability
At several points in time, different members of
the judiciary have advanced at least six separate
doctrines of civil liability placement -which are applicable
to cases involving certified public accountants and third
party financial statement users.

Today, a particular

court could possibly choose any of these concepts in
determining the civil liability of a specific accountant
to a specific third party statement user.

This multi

plicity of available legal doctrines has created substantial
problems for both the courts and the accounting profession.
In outlining any solution to this problem of liability
placement, a two step approach must be taken.

First,

a doctrine of liability placement must be selected
to deal with situations in which the certified public
accountant is guilty of pure fraud.

Second, a concept

of liability placement must be selected to deal with
situations in which the certified public accountant
is guilty of something less the pure fraud (i.e.,
some form of negligence or gross negligence).

If the

courts were to take such an approach to the problem of
liability placement, much of the uncertainty which is
currently inherent in the law of accountants’ third
party liability would be eliminated.
Liability Placement in Cases of Pure Fraud
The earliest doctrine of liability placement
which was applied by the courts to the accountant-third

party relationship was that of legal liability for
pure fraud or deceit.

Under such a concept of liability

placements the public accountant would be held respon
sible for the pecuniary losses suffered by third party
financial statement users if that particular third party
could prove the existence of three prerequisite conditions.
To prove that the accountant is guilty of pure fraud,
the third party must first prove the existence of
scienter; that is, the third party must be able to prove
that the public accountant knew that his financial
representation was false or misleading.

Beyond this

basic proof of scienter, the third party must also prove
the existence of intent on the part of the public
accountant.

In proving the existence of this element

of intent, the third party need not prove that the public
accountant specifically sought to deceive him, but
instead, need only prove that the accountant realized
that the class of persons to which the third party
belonged would be influenced by his financial misrepre
sentation.

Finally, the third party has an obligation

to prove that his reliance was justified.

To accomplish

this task the third party must prove that the fact upon
which he relied was significantly misleading, and yet,
not so misleading as to be obviously false to an
individual possessed of reasonable skill and knowledge
(see chapters two and three).

This basic concept of
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liability for pure fraud was to be the first, and possibly
only, concept of liability placement which was universally
accepted by the courts.
While this threefold concept of legal liability
for pure fraud should be retained by the courts, the
courts must, for several reasons, progress beyond this
initial doctrine if an equitable solution to the problem
of accountants’ civil liability placement is to be
developed.

First, the concept of third party liability

for pure fraud is much too limited to represent a complete
answer to the existing problems.

The courts’ require

ments of the existence of scienter, intent and justifiable
reliance preclude the imposition of civil liability in
the vast majority of cases where the public accountant
neither knows that his representation is misleading, nor
intends the falsity of that representation to cause a
third party to suffer financial injury.7

Second, some

of the recent liberalizations which the courts have
introduced into the law of fraud have added great amounts
of confusion to the area of accountants' civil liability.
The use of such concepts as gross negligence (i.e.,
fraud without proof of scienter and/or intent) as an
inference of fraud have often forced judges and juries to
attempt to draw an almost nonexistent distinction
between gross and ordinary negligence.'®
7lbid.
8Ibid., pp. 417-418.

Thus, while
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liability to third party financial statement users
must continue to be imposed by the courts in cases
involving pure fraud, the courts should abandon their
attempts at expanding the fraud doctrines, and instead,
progress to a more liberal concept of liability place
ment in situations where the failings of the public
accountant are not sufficient to warrant a charge of
pure fraud.
Liability Placement in Cases of Negligence
As the courts attempted to define the principles
which would eventually limit the public accountant’s
liability for misrepresentations which were the result
of faulty, yet not fraudulent, performances of the audit
function, five doctrines of civil liability placement
were developed (see chapter three).

The earliest of

these doctrines of liability placement consisted of the
use of privity of contract as a bar to virtually all
third party litigation.

This privity rule was so strict

as to almost totally eliminate third party recovery
in situations where the accountant was guilty of an
act less serious than fraud.
The first liberalization of the law of accountants'
liability came when the courts allowed third parties
to assert gross negligence as an inference of fraud.
Yet, as has already been stated, the gross negligence
rule was both too restrictive and too confusing for
equitable judicial application.

As the courts became

131
more liberal In their appraoch to accountants' civil lia
bility, the primary benefit rule was used as a basic
doctrine of liability placement.

Although this rule did

provide third parties with a means of recovering damages
from a negligent accountant, the requirement that the
third party be specifically known to the accountant prior
to the performance of the audit function placed a much too
restrictive interpretation on this law of negligence.^
The most liberal step which has actually been taken by the
common law courts in dealing with the accountant-third
party relationship consists of the use of the foreseen
class rule to determine the accountant's liability for
ordinary negligence.

Again, this doctrine of liability

placement does not provide an adequate answer to the prob
lems presently confronting third party statement users.
The foreseen class rule would tend to protect powerful and
sophisticated statement users who are capable of making
sure that the auditor is aware that they are relying upon
the financial representation.10

Thus, such a concept of

liability placement would necessarily exclude the vast
group of third party financial statement users whose reli
ance cannot be specifically foreseen by the accountant.H
9lbid., p. 418.
1(^R. James Gormley, "Accountants' Professional
Liability— A Ten Year Review," Business Lawyer 29 (July,
1974):1212.
■^David B. Isbell and D. R. Carmichael, "Dis
claimers and Liability— The Rhode Island Trust Case,"
Journal of Accountancy 135 (April, 1973).'41.

While it is quite clear that the public accountant
must, at least to some extent, be held responsible for
injuries suffered by third parties due to negligently
prepared financial statements, none of the doctrines
of liability placement which has

been previously espoused

by the courts offers an adequate mechanism for determining
the scope of that liability.

It would therefore seem

that the most equitable approach to the situation must
come from a doctrine beyond those which have already
been developed by the courts.

The concept of legal

liability for negligent misrepresentation to all fore
seeable persons provides such a doctrine.

Under such

a concept of liability placement, the negligent public
accountant would be held legally responsible for the
injuries suffered by all persons, or groups of persons,
who he should have reasonably foreseen as users of the
financial statements which he prepared.

In the course of

a normal audit, the accountant would be potentially
liable to all present and future investors and creditors
that would be normally expected to use the financial
statements.

Such a concept would substantially broaden

the present scope of the public accountant's third party
liability.
Yet, to say that the courts should hold the
accountant liable for negligence to all foreseeable third
parties is not to say that the accountant is legally
responsible for the losses suffered by any of those third

parties.

Several checks must be incorporated into the

doctrine of foreseeability before it is applied by the
courts.

First, the concept of liability to all fore

seeable third parties should not be used to grant recovery
unless the accountant is truely negligent.

The public

accountant should be responsible for the losses of third
party financial statement users only if it can be proven
that the public accountant has failed to perform his
audit function in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards.

The processes undertaken by the

specific public accountant must be compared to those
which would have been undertaken by the reasonably prudent
accountant in making the determination of the accountant's
negligence.

Second, the concept of liability to all

foreseeable.third parties should not be used to grant
recovery unless the public accountant has expressed an
unqualified opinion as to the fairness of the financial
presentation.

If the certified public accountant has

supplemented his opinion with a legally valid disclaimer
or qualification, the third party financial statement
user should be barred from recovery.

Finally, and most

importantly, the concept of liability to all foreseeable
third parties should not be interpreted by the courts
to represent absolute liability for negligence.

The

third party financial statement user must be required
to prove that his reliance on the public accountant's
misrepresentation was the proximate cause of the injury

134
which he suffered.12

If the concept of liability to all

foreseeable third parties is applied in a manner which
incorporates these basic restrictions, the third party
statement user and the public accountant will find the
existence of a legal concept which guarantees adequate
protection from misrepresentation for the third party
and legal stability for the accounting profession.
In determining the scope of the public accountant's
third party liability the courts have had several doctrines
from which to choose.

Yet, if an equitable and noncon

fusing legal situation is to be arrived at, the courts
must take two firm legal steps.

First, the courts

must hold the accountant liable to third partiefe when
that accountant is guilty of pure fraud.

The courts

must consider intent, scienter and reliance to be indispensible elements of this fraud doctrine.

Second, the

courts must hold the accountant liable to all foreseeable
third parties when that accountant is guilty of negligence
in the performance of the audit function.

A violation of

accounting standards, an unqualified audit opinion and
reliance on the part of the third party must be considered
prerequisite elements of this form of recovery.

If

these concepts are employed universally by the courts, an
equitable and determinate concept of liability placement
shall be produced.
12R1chard L. Miller, "Public Accountants and Attor
neys: Negligence and the Third Party," Notre Dame Lawyer
47 (Fall, 1972):605•
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Summary
The legal problems currently facing the public
accounting profession are twofold in nature, and there
fore, must be approached from many different points of
orientation.

This chapter has proposed several concepts

which could serve as the basis of a workable doctrine
of accountants' liability.

First, the courts must allow

the accounting profession to establish the standards of
conduct by which its members will be judged.

Second,

the courts should employ the concept of the reasonable
man in comparing the function performed by an individual
accountant to that required by professional standards.
Third, the courts should reject overly general disclaimers
and qualifications of the opinion advanced by the public
accountant.

Fourth, the courts must continue to hold

public accountants liable to third parties when the account
ant is guilty of pure fraud.

Finally, the courts must

begin to hold negligent accountants liable to all
reasonably foreseeable third party statement users.

This

five step approach to accountants' civil liability both
narrows the gap between the legal and professional
interpretations of the accountant's duties and provides for
an equitable and definitive distribution of the burden
which results from financial misrepresentations.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The public accounting profession is today confronted
with two legal problems of major significance.

The first

of these legal problems is the result of the judiciary’s
recent infringement upon a set of rights which had tradi
tionally been granted to the members of all skilled
professions.

This recent infringement has resulted in

a judicial interpretation of the public accountant’s
responsibilities which differs substantially from the
interpretation which has been advanced by the public
accounting profession.

The second of these legal problems

is the result of the judiciary's espousal of six distinct
concepts of civil liability placement.

The espousal

of these six applicable doctrines has left the public
accountant in the middle of a confusing, and often
stultifying, situation.

This dissertation has presented

a five step approach toward analyzing and solving these
legal problems.
Chapter two of this dissertation undertook to
provide an historical perspective of the development of
accountants' civil liability.

It was found that the

English Courts produced the first significant legal
136
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doctrines which were to be applied to the accountantthird party relationship.

The American Courts were to

later build upon these early concepts by proposing certain
specific interpretations and applications of the British
Doctrines.

Yet, it was the New York Court, acting in

the economically depressed thirties, that established
the most lasting concept of accountants' third party
liability.

During the depression years, the New York

Court sought to balance legal equity with social need,
and in so doing, produced a restrictive concept of liability
which was to be almost universally accepted by the courts
for years to come.
As early legal doctrines began to intermingle with
the complex societal and economic system of the sixties
and seventies, a most perplexing situation began to develop.
The first problem to confront the accounting profession
resulted when the judiciary began to infringe upon the
public accounting profession's right to establish the
rules of conduct by which its members would be required
to abide.

This once universal right of all skilled

professions was substantially reduced when the courts
began to espouse standards of professional conduct with
regard to the disclosure of subsequently acquired informa
tion, the detection of corporate fraud, the preparation
of unaudited financial statements and the disclosure
of current value financial information.

As the judiciary's

infringement upon the rights of public accounting grew,
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the profession began to redirect its major efforts away
from serving the economic sector and toward the avoidance
of civil liability.
A second problem for the profession emerged in
the form of a diverse set of doctrines of liability
placement.

As the modern courts reinterpreted and expanded

the doctrines which had been developed by the early
English and American Courts, the accountant found
himself confronted with at least six distinct concepts
of third party liability placement.

In a given situation,

a particular court could apply concepts of liability
placement which ranged from a most conservative doctrine
which was based upon a concept of pure fraud, to a most
liberal doctrine which was based upon foreseeability
and ordinary negligence.

Thus, not only is the account

ant today confronted with a discrepancy between legal
and professional standards of conduct, but he is also
confronted with a situation in which the determination
of the scope of his liability is an almost impossible
task.
Chapter four sought to analyze the balancing
process through which a doctrine of accountants* liability
could be developed.

In so doing, this chapter sought

to describe both the justifications for, and effects of
an extension of the public accountant's third party lia
bility.

It was found that there were three legal justifi

cations for an extension of the public accountant's civil

liability.

First, it was argued that while the accounting

profession has been eager to reap the benefits of the
professional status which its members have achieved,
public accountants have been unwilling to accept a
concomitant degree of legal responsibility.

Second,

it was found that while the third party was virtually
forced to rely upon the financial representations of
public accountants, that third party had little legal
recourse to an accountant who had performed his function
improperly.

Third, it was found that if the legal system

is to treat all individuals in a fair and equitable
manner, the accountant must assume a greater degree of
third party liability.

Thus, it would seem that there

is substantial legal justification for an extension of
the public accountant’s third party civil liability.
Beyond these basic legal justifications, chapter
four sought to analyze the effects that an extension
of the accountant's liability would have on both the
profession and economic society.

It was found that an

extension of the public accountant’s third party liability
would contribute to the quality of accounting services
while not representing a significant threat to the
economic stability of the accounting profession.

There

fore, chapter four concluded that there were significant
reasons for extending the third party civil liability of
public accountants beyond its present limits.

Chapter five sought to implement the conclusions
drawn in chapter four while solving the basic problems
which were discussed in chapter three.
task a five step approach was taken.

To accomplish this
First, it was

proposed that the public accounting profession be
allowed to implement its own standards of professional
conduct.

Second, it was proposed that the courts continue

to use the reasonable man as a basis for comparing the
activities of an individual accountant to the standards
of the profession as a whole.

Third, it was proposed

that the courts preclude accountants from using dis
claimers and qualifications as a means of liability
avoidance.

Fourth, it was proposed that the courts

continue to hold accountants liable to third parties
when the accountants are guilty of pure fraud.

Finally,

it was proposed that the courts hold accountants liable
to all reasonably foreseeable third parties when the
accountants are guilty of any form of negligence.

Such

an approach to accountants’ third party liability would
provide a more liberal concept of third party recovery
while contributing to a sound system of law within which
a solution to the problems confronting the accounting
profession may be built.
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